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Recognizing Rights in Real Time:
The Role of Google in the EU Right
to Be Forgotten
Edward Lee*
This Article analyzes the prominent role Google is playing in the
development of the right to be forgotten (“RTBF”) in the European Union
(“EU”). The Article conceptualizes Google’s role as a private
administrative agency with quasi-lawmaking, quasi-adjudicative, and
quasi-enforcement powers. My theory builds on several bodies of
scholarship, including writings related to mixed administration in the
United States, co-regulation in Europe, and global administrative law, as
well as Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and Coase’s theory of the firm. The
central insight of my theory of the private administrative agency is that
corporations like Google may operate in a quasi-governmental, regulatory
capacity in administering public rights on a global scale.
While Google’s role raises concerns of democratic accountability, it also
brings significant advantages in resources, efficiency, analytics, and
flexibility that a public agency would not possess. In order to preserve
these advantages, this Article proposes to keep intact much of Google’s
independent decision-making in processing RTBF claims. But this Article
calls for the creation of a hybrid agency (consisting of industry,
government, and democratically elected representatives) to provide
greater oversight to the entire process in the EU. The agency will create a
standard webform for people to make RTBF requests with all search
engines and will institute an administrative appellate body to resolve
* Copyright © 2016 Edward Lee. Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. Founder, The Free Internet Project. Many thanks to Iga Bałos, Maciej
Barczewski, Chris Buccafusco, Maggie Chon, Graeme Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss,
Susy Frankel, Daniel Gervais, Justin Hughes, Hal Krent, Patrick Goold, Neil Richards,
Chris Schmidt, David Schwartz, Peter Swire, and Adrian Walters. I also am indebted to
the participants of Chicago-Kent faculty workshop, the International IP Roundtable at
Duke University, and the Internet Works in Progress at Santa Clara University School
of Law for their comments and suggestions. Ryan Backman provided excellent
research assistance.
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conflicts among the search engines over the same RTBF claim. The
proposed oversight agency represents a form of public-private partnership
and global governance, designed to increase democratic accountability and
transparency in Google’s implementation of the right to be forgotten.
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“[Google] didn’t ask to be the decision maker.”1
—Eric Schmidt, Google Chairman
INTRODUCTION
On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) decided a landmark case that has the potential to reshape
the way in which Internet search engines — and possibly the Internet
in general — operate.2 Prior to the decision, much of the Internet was
designed on a de facto principle that the Internet never forgets.3
Unlike print copies of newspapers, books, and other materials, much
information published on the Internet has a shelf life of no end.
Although a permanent, easy-to-access archive of nearly all information
ever published has its virtues, it also has potential vices. When it
comes to personal information, the Internet that never forgets may
forever accentuate the worst or most embarrassing moments of a
person’s life. Indeed, in some cases, the only information about a
person that can be found by an Internet search may be the person’s
most embarrassing or regrettable moment. Humans thus become
defined by their past mistakes, failings, and scandals, but nothing else.
Frailty, thy name is human.
The CJEU’s decision in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos may radically change the Internet that never
forgets.4 The Court held that Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, as implemented by the 1995 EU Data
Protection Directive, recognizes a right to be forgotten for individuals
in the European Union (“EU”).5 The decision marks the first time the
CJEU has recognized the right to be forgotten by name. This
newfound right emanates from the EU Charter’s right of rectification
in Article 8 and from the Directive’s Article 12(b) right of
1 Aoife White, Google EU Ruling Response Vetted as Complaints Pile Up,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:04 AM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-18/google-eu-ruling-response-vetted-ascomplaints-pile-up.
2 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD) (Costeja), 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
3 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html; see also
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
50-91 (2009) (explaining how digital technology, storage, easy retrieval, and global
span have led to the demise of forgetting).
4 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131.
5 Id. ¶¶ 69–70, 91, 97.
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“rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does
not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because
of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”6 But the CJEU
gave the right of rectification a more robust application specifically
regarding Internet search engines.
Under the Court’s ruling, individuals in the EU have a right to
request search engines to remove, from search results for the
individual’s name, links to web content that contains personal
information about the individual that is “inadequate, irrelevant or
excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing,” “not kept up
to date,” or “kept for longer than is necessary.”7 In such cases, a
person’s privacy interest trumps the search engine’s economic interest
and the public’s interest in accessing the information.8 However, in
other cases, the right to be forgotten may not justify the removal of
links, such as if the person was a public figure and the general public’s
interest in the information outweighs the right to be forgotten.9 These
determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis with each
individual request. Moreover, importantly, the publisher of the
underlying web content does not necessarily have an obligation to
remove the article, so the content itself remains online (i.e. only the
link to the article is removed from a search of the person’s name).10
Besides outlining the general contours of the right, the CJEU’s
decision is noticeably vague. For starters, what was the precise reason
Mario Costeja González, the party in the case, was entitled to removal
of the links to the articles?11 Was the information inaccurate?

6 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 391, 397–; Council Directive 95/46, art. 12(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC)
[hereinafter 1995 DP Directive].
7 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 92, 94.
8 Id. ¶ 97.
9 Id.
10 See id. ¶¶ 85–88.
11 See id. ¶ 98 (“As regards a situation such as that at issue in the main
proceedings, which concerns the display, in the list of results that the internet user
obtains by making a search by means of Google Search on the basis of the data
subject’s name, of links to pages of the on-line archives of a daily newspaper that
contain announcements mentioning the data subject’s name and relating to a realestate auction connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of social
security debts, it should be held that, having regard to the sensitivity for the data
subject’s private life of the information contained in those announcements and to the
fact that its initial publication had taken place 16 years earlier, the data subject
establishes a right that that information should no longer be linked to his name by
means of such a list.”).
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Inadequate? Excessive? Or just old? The CJEU did not say.12
Ultimately, the CJEU left determinations of erasure requests to be
decided on a case-by-case basis, presumably by the search engine or
other entity receiving such a request.13 Moreover, the Costeja decision
was issued after the EU Parliament had already begun debate on a new
proposed Data Protection Regulation that will, if adopted, update the
EU data privacy law, including a comprehensive, more detailed
provision for a “[r]ight to be forgotten and to erasure.”14 The right to
be forgotten is, in other words, still under development.
Much of the crucial development has fallen to Google.15 The EU has
left Google with the primary burden of operationalizing the right to be
12 See id. In practice, the members of the EU treat the decision of the CJEU as
having precedential value. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in
the Internationalizing World, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 102-03 (2005) (“[T]here is
growing recognition of the precedential value of Court of Justice decisions even to
factually dissimilar cases.”); Charles R. McGuire, The Constitution of the European
Union: Content, Prospects and Comparisons to the U.S. Constitution, 12 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 307, 325 (2005) (“EU law has been strengthened and extended by the ECJ,
and it is clear that the precedent value of the ECJ decisions goes far beyond the usual
weight given decisions in other European civil law courts.”). The CJEU itself
sometimes treats its own decisions as precedents. See Karen McAuliffe, Precedent at the
Court of Justice of the European Union: The Linguistic Aspect, in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2011, at 483, 483 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013).
13 The CJEU did not even specify that the search engine was to be the decisionmaker, although it was arguably implied by its analysis. See Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex
62012CJ0131, ¶ 94 (“Therefore, if it is found, following a request by the data subject
pursuant to Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46, that the inclusion in the list of results
displayed following a search made on the basis of his name of the links to web pages
published lawfully by third parties and containing true information relating to him
personally is, at this point in time, incompatible with Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of the directive
because that information appears, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to be
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the
processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search engine, the information and
links concerned in the list of results must be erased.” (emphasis added)).
14 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 51-53, COM (2012) 011
final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011. See generally Hunton &
Williams LLP, European Parliament Adopts Draft General Data Protection Regulation; Calls
for Suspension of Safe Harbor, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/03/articles/european-parliament-adopts-draftgeneral-data-protection-regulation-calls-suspension-safe-harbor/.
15 In 2015, in an unrelated corporate decision, Google restructured its business
into a holding company called Alphabet with several other corporate entities,
including Google as a wholly owned subsidiary that continues to operate the search
engine. See Matt Rosoff, What Is Alphabet, Google’s New Company?, BUS. INSIDER (Aug.
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forgotten, as well as figuring out its contours. Though a for-profit
corporation, Google is functioning similar to how a government
agency or administrative body might act. Google has appointed an
Advisory Council consisting of ten prominent professionals (eight
from outside of Google) “to review input from dozens of experts in
meetings across Europe, as well as from thousands of submissions via
the Web,” in order to decide the contours of the right to be
forgotten.16 On its website in EU countries, Google has set up a web
form for individuals to request removal of links to content containing
personal information of the requestor.17 Google has assigned staff to
process and decide each request.18 Within six months of the CJEU
decision, Google received over 160,000 removal requests and denied a
majority (approximately 58%) of them.19 Google issues, on its website,
a near real time “Transparency Report” detailing the number of
requests, grants, and denials.20 It also submitted answers to the EU
Article 29 Working Party’s inquiry about how the search engine was
implementing the right to be forgotten thus far.21 In its answers, as
well as in public statements from its officials, Google expressed its

10, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-alphabet-googles-newcompany-2015-8. Based on the initial accounts of the restructuring, it does not appear
that it will change how Google processes RTBF requests.
16 See Google Advisory Council, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
17 Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en (last visited
Sept. 21, 2015).
18 See Sam Schechner, Google Starts Removing Search Results Under Europe’s “Right
to Be Forgotten,” WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2014, 3:28 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/google-starts-removing-search-results-under-europes-right-to-be-forgotten1403774023 [hereinafter Google Removing Search Results] (“The company has hired a
dedicated ‘removals team’ to evaluate each request[.]”).
19 See Matt McGee, Google: We Acted Quickly on Right to Be Forgotten Requests to
Avoid Litigation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:45 PM),
http://searchengineland.com/google-act-quickly-rtbf-requests-avoid-litigation-207431.
20 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en
(last visited Dec. 10, 2015). Because Google updates the report continuously, the
numbers in the report appear to change as Google processes more requests. Given the
constant updating, it may not be possible to verify from the webpage the numbers
reported by Google on an earlier date. In reporting the numbers from Google’s
webpage, this Article specifies the date on which the report was viewed.
21 Responding to Article 29 Working Party’s Questions, GOOGLE: EUR. BLOG (July 31,
2014), http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2014/07/responding-to-article-29-workingpartys.html. Microsoft and Yahoo were also asked to submit their answers to the EU
questions. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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difficulty in deciding the many requests without more guidance from
the EU on how to balance the factors the CJEU briefly mentioned.22
This Article examines the significant role that Google is playing in
the development of the EU right to be forgotten and posits that Google
is functioning like a private administrative agency. Google is not only
implementing the CJEU’s right-to-be-forgotten decision, but it is also
being asked to develop and define further (at least in the first instance)
the contours of the right that the CJEU left ambiguous. Google is
operating much like a government agency with numerous
responsibilities, including quasi-lawmaking, quasi-adjudicative, and
quasi-enforcement powers. Of course, EU government entities,
especially the Article 29 Working Party, are providing oversight and
guidance to the implementation of the right to be forgotten. But
Google is a central player in this entire legal landscape.
This Article asks whether such a role in implementing, developing,
and deciding a fundamental right of privacy in the EU should fall to a
for-profit corporation, such as Google.23 Part I analyzes the
recognition of the EU right to be forgotten, focusing on how the
CJEU’s decision in Costeja left Google with much of the responsibility
in defining the right. Part II discusses how Google, along with the EU
and national government entities, are operationalizing the right to be
forgotten. Drawing upon the theory of Weber on bureaucracies and
Coase on the firm, Part III develops the concept of the private
administrative agency. This Part situates the private administrative
22 See Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, to Isabelle FalquePierrotin, Chair, Article 29 Working Party, at 4-5 (July 31, 2014) [hereinafter Letter
from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin], available at https://docs.google.com/
a/kentlaw.iit.edu/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/preview (“Each criterion
has its own potential complications and challenges . . . . We welcome the input of the
Working Party both in identifying further areas where the balance of interests is
particularly challenging, and in providing guidance on how to resolve those
challenges in a just and consistent way.”); McGee, supra note 19 (“The terms of the
ruling were vague . . . . There wasn’t guidance as to how we should implement it.”
(quoting Peter Barron, head of Google’s European communications) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
23 This Article brackets the larger normative question on desirability of adopting the
right to be forgotten. Critics especially from the United States have complained that the
right impinges on the free speech and access to information. See generally Steven C.
Bennett, The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 161, 167-68 (2012); Craig Timberg & Sarah Halzack, Right to Be Forgotten vs.
Free Speech, WASH. POST (May 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/right-to-be-forgotten-vs-free-speech/2014/05/14/53c9154c-db9d-11e3-bda19b46b2066796_story.html. I have proposed a limited, private right to be forgotten for
Google to adopt as a matter of its own policy. See Edward Lee, The Right to Be Forgotten
v. Free Speech, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 18).
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agency within the existing literature on mixed administration in the
United States, co-regulation in Europe, and global administrative law.
Building on this theory, Part IV contends that Google is operating as a
private administrative agency in its development of the right to be
forgotten.
Part V analyzes the tradeoffs in delegating such a significant
responsibility to Google, a for-profit corporation that is not subject to
the kind of democratic accountability that government agencies
commonly face. While noting several major concerns with the EU’s
approach, this Part suggests that such delegation to Google has several
important benefits, including gaining Google’s administrative ability to
process efficiently thousands of requests (as it does in the copyright
context for notice-and-takedown requests), its technical know-how in
web design and analytics, and, perhaps most important of all, the
greater flexibility and experimentation Google may enjoy in
developing the right than a government agency would enjoy. Part VI
offers several possible reforms to the process by which right-to-beforgotten requests are currently processed and decided. Key among the
reforms are (i) the creation of a standard webform by which
individuals can request delisting of links from all search engines of
their choosing (e.g., Google, Bing, and Yahoo!) and (ii) the creation of
a hybrid public/private agency comprised of representatives of the
search engines, the EU government, and the public who would
provide oversight to the entire process and who would act as an
administrative appellate body to review conflicts among the search
engines in their decisions of the same request. These reforms are
meant to preserve the efficiencies and flexibilities of allowing
corporations to process the right-to-be-forgotten claims in the first
instance, while developing greater consistency and predictability in
how such claims are decided as well as increasing transparency and
democratic accountability.
I.

THE CJEU’S RECOGNITION OF THE EU RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

This Part outlines the evolution of the right to be forgotten in the
EU from its latent codification under the general right of rectification
in the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive to its formal recognition in
the context of Internet search engines by the Court of Justice of the
European Union in May 2014. Until the CJEU’s decision in 2014, it
was not clear whether a “right to be forgotten” existed in the EU. Even
after the decision, the precise contours of the right are still unclear.
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A. The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive
1.

Legal Background

In 1995, the EU Parliament and Council enacted an important
directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data.24 The Data Protection Directive was the first of its
kind anywhere in the world.25 It has influenced other countries in
adopting comparable protections.26 The Directive established
comprehensive requirements on how personal data can be processed
that all EU members (currently 28 countries) must implement
through their national laws.27 The EU considers the processing of
personal data as a potential encroachment on the right to privacy,
which is considered a fundamental right.28
The data protection requirements are broad. They apply to any
“controller” of personal data that falls within the scope of the Directive
based on the controller’s establishment being located in an EU
member.29 Article 2 defines “personal data,” “processing of personal
data,” and “controller” in very broad terms.30 Personal data “shall
mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person.”31 “Identifiable person” is defined broadly as well: “one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.”32
Article 6(1) sets forth the five key principles that apply to the
processing of personal data. First, “personal data must be . . .
24 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6. A directive does not have direct force of law on
EU members. Each member must enact implementing law to carry out the obligations
of the directive. See, e.g., id. art. 32, at 49-50 (ordering member states to “bring into
force” the EU’s directive); see also Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION,
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2015) (explaining difference between EU directives and regulations).
25 See International Privacy Issues, 23 INT’L HR J., no. 3, Summer 2014.
26 See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third
Countries, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/internationaltransfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
27 See International Privacy Issues, supra note 25; Commission Decisions on the
Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, supra note 26.
28 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, preamble ¶¶ 10, 25, at 32-33.
29 Id. art. 4, at 39.
30 See id. art. 2(a)–(b), (d), at 39.
31 Id. art. 2(a).
32 Id.
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processed fairly and lawfully.”33 Second, it must be “collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in
a way incompatible with those purposes.”34 Third, personal data must
be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and/or further processed.”35 Fourth, and
important to the right to be forgotten, personal data must be “accurate
and, where necessary, kept up to date.”36 Accordingly, “every
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate
or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for they were collected
or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified.”37 Fifth,
personal data must be “kept in a form which permits identification of
data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for
which the data were collected or for which they are further
processed.”38
The fourth principle above provides the basis for a right of
rectification in Article 12, which was one of the key provisions for the
right to be forgotten later recognized in Costeja.39 Under Article 12,
“every data subject” has “the right to obtain from the controller . . . as
appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of
which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in
particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”40
The Directive establishes the Article 29 Working Party, which acts as
an advisory body to the EU Commission.41 The Working Party consists
of “a representative of the supervisory authority or authorities
designated by each Member State and of a representative of the
authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and
bodies, and of a representative of the Commission.”42 One of the main
responsibilities of the Working Party is to help ensure that the various
EU countries are protecting personal data in a uniform manner, despite
the fact that each country has its own data protection authority to
oversee implementation of the Directive under its national laws.43
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. art. 6(1)(a), at 40.
Id. art. 6(1)(b).
Id. art. 6(1)(c).
Id. art. 6(1)(d).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. art. 6(1)(e).
See Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 88, 94 (May 13, 2014).
1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, art. 12(a)–(b), at 42 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 29(1), at 48.
Id. art. 29(2).
See id. art. 30.
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Internet Search Engines and Growth of Web Content

When the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive was enacted, the
World Wide Web was still in its infancy. Search engines were
rudimentary. Google did not even exist. It was difficult for people to
find relevant information on the Web without a lot of time, searching
through false positive results, and trial and error. Google, founded in
1998, revolutionized search engines with a highly accurate algorithm
that indexed web pages based on the number of links from other web
pages.44 Google soon became the most used search engine, in part
because “googling” a search term usually produced links to relevant
articles better than previous search technology.45 In short, Google
helped people quickly find the information they wanted.
Meanwhile, the amount of content online continued to grow
exponentially. In 1995, only 23,500 websites existed.46 By 2005, the
number grew to 60 million websites.47 By 2008, over 160 million.48 By
2012, over 600 million.49
This incredible growth of online content had a byproduct: the
establishment of a permanent record or database of sorts that can store
vast amounts of information — including personal information —
forever. As the capacity of servers increased exponentially, there was
practically no technological reason for people to take down or delete
old information. The default became that all content, once posted,
remains online unless the source affirmatively removes it. In popular
parlance, “the Internet never forgets.” As Jeffrey Rosen recognized
back in 2010:
[T]he Internet records everything and forgets nothing . . .
every online photo, status update, Twitter post and blog entry
by and about us can be stored forever. With Web sites like
LOL Facebook Moments, which collects and shares
embarrassing personal revelations from Facebook users, ill-

44

See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 50-58 (2005).
See id. at 96.
46 How We Got from 1 to 162 Million Websites on the Internet, PINGDOM.COM (Apr. 4,
2008), http://royal.pingdom.com/2008/04/04/how-we-got-from-1-to-162-million-websiteson-the-internet/.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.
com/total-number-of-websites/#trend (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
45
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advised photos and online chatter are coming back to haunt
people months or years after the fact.50
The Internet that never forgets was in possible tension with the EU
Data Protection Directive, especially its requirement allowing
“identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the
purposes for which the data were collected.”51 This tension remained
latent for many years, however. Nearly twenty years passed before the
issue was presented to the Court of Justice.
B. The Costeja Case
On March 5, 2010, a Spanish citizen named Mario Costeja González
filed a complaint with Spain’s Data Protection Agency (Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos or “AEPD”), which administers the EU
Data Protection Directive in Spain.52 The complaint was against
Google Spain, Google, and a Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia
Ediciones SL.53 Costeja alleged that a Google search of his name
resulted in links to two pages of La Vanguardia from January 19, 1998
and March 9, 1998.54 The old posts included an announcement of a
real estate auction of Costeja’s house, which was subject to attachment
proceedings due to his failure to pay social security debts.55 Costeja
claimed that the publication of these old posts violated his privacy
rights under the Data Protection Directive because “the attachment
proceedings . . . had been fully resolved for a number of years and that
reference to them was now entirely irrelevant.”56
The AEPD ruled in favor of Costeja, but only on his claim against
Google Spain and Google: the newspaper was justified in posting the
auction notice because “it took place upon order of the Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity
to the auction in order to secure as many bidders as possible.”57
However, the AEPD required Google to remove access to the links to
the old newspaper posts in searches of Costeja’s name, even “without it
being necessary to erase the data or information from the website where

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Rosen, supra note 3.
See 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, art. 6(e), at 40.
Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 14–17 (May 13, 2014).
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
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they appear.”58 The CJEU’s ruling created a split decision: the news
articles containing the old information of Costeja’s debt did not violate
the Data Protection Directive, but the Google search results of Costeja’s
name that produced links to those articles did.59
Upon appeal, Spain’s National High Court referred to the CJEU
several questions related to the interpretation of the 1995 Directive
and its application to search engines.60 On May 13, 2014, the CJEU
rendered its landmark decision, which agreed with the AEPD’s ruling
and explicitly referred to Costeja’s argument that the fundamental
rights of privacy and data protection include “the right to be
forgotten,” although the CJEU did not use the term beyond that
reference.61
In the key part of its decision, the CJEU ruled:
[T]he supervisory authority or judicial authority may order
the operator of the search engine to remove from the list of
results displayed following a search made on the basis of a
person’s name links to web pages published by third parties
containing information relating to that person, without an
order to that effect presupposing the previous or simultaneous
removal of that name and information — of the publisher’s
own accord or following an order of one of those authorities
— from the web page on which they were published.62
The CJEU based its holding on the right of “rectification, erasure or
blocking of data” under Article 12(b) of the Data Protection Directive,
as well as Article 14(a).63 The CJEU rejected Google’s and Austria’s
arguments that a party invoking the right of rectification should go first
to the publisher of the information to seek its removal or should obtain
a determination that the information is unlawful or incomplete before
58

Id. ¶ 17.
See id. ¶¶ 86–88, 98–99.
60 Id. ¶¶ 18–20.
61 Id. ¶¶ 91, 94. Some have suggested that the right to be forgotten has historical
antecedents in nineteenth century dueling codes and laws in Europe, which enabled
people to defend their honor (such as from embarrassing facts) by challenging another
person to a duel. See, e.g., Tom Gara, The Origins of the ‘Right to be Forgotten’: Sir, I
Demand a Duel, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 14, 2014, 4:00 PM ET),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/05/14/the-origins-of-the-right-to-beforgotten-sir-i-demand-a-duel/; Caroline Winter, Dueling Gives Way to ‘Right to Be
Forgotten’ on Google, SFGATE (May 18, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/
technology/article/Dueling-gives-way-to-right-to-be-forgotten-on-5487814.php.
62 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 82.
63 Id. ¶¶ 70, 88.
59
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approaching a search engine.64 The CJEU explained that a search engine
itself performs the processing of personal data that is distinct from the
publisher.65 Moreover, the CJEU believed that requiring search engines
to remove links may be a more effective way to protect privacy rights,
“given the ease with which information published on a website can be
replicated on other sites and the fact that the persons responsible for its
publication are not always subject to [EU] legislation.”66 The CJEU also
indicated that a search engine and a publisher may have different
interests and possible exemptions (e.g., a publisher may have an
exemption for publishing information “solely for journalistic purposes”
under Article 9) in deciding whether to accept a person’s claim of a right
of rectification under Article 12(b).67
Underlying the CJEU’s decision is a sense of the sheer power that
search engines like Google wield in the information age:
Indeed, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed
following a search made on the basis of a person’s name, of a
web page and of the information contained on it relating to
that person makes access to that information appreciably easier
for any internet user making a search in respect of the person
concerned and may play a decisive role in the dissemination of
that information, it is liable to constitute a more significant
interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to
privacy than the publication on the web page.68
The CJEU highlighted the “decisive role” search engines play in
enabling personal data to be found on the Internet.69 Search engines
have the power to create a personal profile based on the aggregation of
disparate pieces of information about a person:
[T]hat processing enables any internet user to obtain through
the list of results a structured overview of the information
relating to that individual that can be found on the internet —
information which potentially concerns a vast number of
aspects of his private life and which, without the search
engine, could not have been interconnected or could have

64
65
66
67
68
69

See id. ¶¶ 63–64.
See id. ¶ 83.
Id. ¶ 84.
Id. ¶¶ 85–86.
Id. ¶ 87 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶¶ 36–38.
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been only with great difficulty — and thereby to establish a
more or less detailed profile of him.70
Given the power that search engines hold, “the effect of the
interference with those rights of the data subject is heightened on
account of the important role played by the internet and search
engines in modern society, which render the information contained in
such a list of results ubiquitous.”71
C. What Costeja Leaves Unclear
Despite its importance in recognizing a right to be forgotten, the
Costeja decision is noticeably vague on what this right entails. For
starters, it is not clear what made the links to the old posts about
Costeja’s debt in violation of the Directive. Was it based simply on the
fact that the posts contained personal information that was sixteen
years old? If so, could the violation be rectified with a notice that
indicated the final successful resolution of Costeja’s debt? Of course,
as an institution, the CJEU only interprets and decides the meaning of
EU law; it does not actually rule on the particular facts of a case
(although the outcome of the case was clearly suggested in the CJEU’s
decision).72 In Costeja, the CJEU all but ruled that there was a
violation even without fully explaining what the reason for the
violation was:
[I]t should be held that, having regard to the sensitivity for the
data subject’s private life of the information contained in those
announcements and to the fact that its initial publication had
taken place 16 years earlier, the data subject establishes a right
that that information should no longer be linked to his name
by means of such a list. Accordingly, since in the case in point
there do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a
preponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of
such a search, access to that information, a matter which is,
however, for the referring court to establish, the data subject may,
by virtue of Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first
paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46, require those links to
be removed from the list of results.73

70
71
72
73

Id. ¶ 80.
Id.
See id. ¶ 98.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Even beyond the particular dispute involving Costeja, the CJEU left
many of the contours of the right to be forgotten for future
elaboration, apparently on a case-by-case basis. A search engine must
remove links in the following situation:
[I]f it is found, following a request by the data subject . . . that
the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a search
made on the basis of his name of the links to web pages
published lawfully by third parties and containing true
information relating to him personally is, at [that] point in
time, incompatible with Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of the directive
because that information appears, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the
processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search
engine . . . .74
The CJEU clarified that the personal information does not have to
cause prejudice to the individual in order to establish a right of
erasure75 and that, “as a rule,” the privacy interests of the individual
outweigh the search engine’s economic interest and the public’s
interest in finding the information.76 However, despite characterizing
its approach as a “rule,” the CJEU also noted that the right to be
forgotten is subject to the balancing of public’s interest in the
information. Removal of links would not be warranted “if it
appeared . . . such as [by] the role played by the data subject in public
life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the
preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of
inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”77
The latter part of the CJEU’s explanation appeared to make its
approach less of a rule and more of a standard, requiring case-by-case
analysis.78 And, for Costeja, in an ironic and perhaps cruel twist, the
Spanish data protection authority later ruled that his right to be
forgotten did not extend to recent negative comments published
74

Id. ¶ 94 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 96.
76 Id. ¶ 97.
77 Id.
78 There is extensive literature on rules versus standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing the
costs of promulgating a rule versus a standard); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-713 (1976) (discussing
differences between rules and standards).
75
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online regarding his court victory, given the public interest in the
decision.79
II.

OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN REAL TIME

One of the most important parts of the Costeja decision is what it
does not say: how to operationalize or put into practice, in the EU, a
procedure and a set of criteria for determining claims invoking the
right to be forgotten in search engine results. Part II explains how the
primary responsibility fell not upon government actors or agencies,
but upon Google.
A. The Role of Google
The ambiguities of the right to be forgotten left open by the Costeja
decision begs the question: what institution should have the primary
responsibility of addressing or clearing up those ambiguities? The Data
Protection Authorities or national courts of EU members would seem to
be logical choices. As it has turned out, however, the primary
responsibility has fallen to Google to figure out the contours of the right
to be forgotten. Google has played a defining role in operationalizing
the right to be forgotten and deciding what circumstances warrant a
removal of a link to personal information or not. Other search engines,
such as Yahoo! and Bing, have also played a part, but they have not
(yet) been as prominent in the public debate related to the
implementation of the right — perhaps because, in Oct. 2014, Google
had over 92% market share for searches in Europe, followed by Bing at
2.67% and Yahoo! at 2.34%.80 Given Google’s dominance in users and
market share for search, its decisions may have a greater impact than
other search engines’ decisions for their sites.
1.

Google Is Delegated Much Authority

Perhaps the most striking thing about how the contours of the right
to be forgotten are being developed in the EU is that the primary
responsibility in the first instance has fallen to the search engines,
79 Miquel Peguera, No More Right-to-Be-Forgotten for Mr. Costeja, Says Spanish Data
Protection Authority, STAN. CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 3, 2015, 8:24 AM),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/no-more-right-be-forgotten-mr-costeja-saysspanish-data-protection-authority.
80 See Matt Rosoff, Here’s How Dominant Google Is in Europe, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
29, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-dominant-google-isin-europe-2014-11 [hereinafter Google in Europe] (citing StatCounter).
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especially Google. One could easily envision a different procedure: the
Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) in each EU member would receive
the initial request from an individual invoking the right to be
forgotten, and the DPA would determine whether the claim was valid.
If it was, the DPA would then render a decision and order the search
engine to remove the link to the web post.
But that’s not what happened after Costeja. Instead, the procedure
fell directly on the search engines to process and decide RTBF claims
made by individuals.81 Given the minimal guidance in the Costeja
decision, considerable discretion and authority were delegated, in
effect, to Google to develop the RTBF on a case-by-case basis.82 Of
course, Google’s decisions can still be appealed to the national Data
Protection Authorities or courts.83 But the important first analysis of
each claim falls upon Google, which may be the sole arbiter of the vast
majority of claims if there are few appeals.84
Some critics have openly questioned and criticized the power
Google has attained in this process. European Parliament Member Jan
Philipp Albrecht argued that Google should not be making “these
decisions without some sort of independent oversight,” and he
suggested that the proposed amendment to the EU’s data protection
law include such a requirement.85 The United Kingdom House of
Lords’ Home Affairs, Health and Education EU Subcommittee went
even further, declaring:
[W]e . . . believe that it is wrong in principle to leave search
engines themselves the task of deciding whether to delete
information or not, based on vague, ambiguous and unhelpful
criteria, and we heard from witnesses how uncomfortable they
are with the idea of a commercial company sitting in judgment
on issues like that.86

81

See infra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
83 See 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, art. 22, at 45 (recognizing judicial remedy
as a requirement to protect privacy in addition to any administrative remedy EU
members establish). Each EU member has its own data protection authority. See
European Union, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/bodies/
authorities/eu/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
84 See infra Part II.A.2.
85 Jennifer Baker, Right to Be forgotten? That’s Not Google’s Call — Data MEP
Albrecht, REGISTER (Jan. 7, 2015, 4:59 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/07/right_to_be_forgotten_not_google_call_data
_mep_albrecht/.
86 Alex Hern, Lords Describe Right to Be Forgotten as ‘Unworkable, Unreasonable, and
82
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Even Google Chairman Eric Schmidt questioned leaving the
responsibility to Google to decide the requests and remarked publicly
that Google “didn’t ask to be the decision maker.”87 His sentiment was
echoed by Google European Communications Director Peter Barron,
who stated: “[Google] never expected or wanted to make . . . [these]
complicated decisions that would in the past have been extensively
examined in the courts, [but are] now being made by scores of lawyers
and paralegal assistants [at Google].”88 Nonetheless, the primary
responsibility of operationalizing and determining the RTBF has fallen
on Google. If Google shirked its responsibility, it could face
substantial fines.89
2.

Google Establishes an Administrative Procedure for Filing and
Deciding RTBF Claims

Based upon its interpretation of Costeja and exercising the
considerable discretion it affords, Google implemented the decision in
the following way as depicted in Figure 1. From the outset, Google
acknowledged that its process is a work-in-progress and will evolve
“as data protection authorities and courts issue guidance and as we all
learn through experience.”90

Wrong,’ GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014, 4:56 AM EDT) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/30/lords-right-to-be-forgotten-rulingunworkable.
87 White, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88 Julia Powles, Google Says It Acknowledges Some People Want ‘Right to Be
Forgotten,’ GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2015, 11:09 EST) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/19/google-acknowledges-somepeople-want-right-to-be-forgotten.
89 See, e.g., Owen Bowcott & Kim Willsher, Google’s French Arm Faces Daily €1,000
Fines over Links to Defamatory Article, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2014, 7:53 EST), http://
www.theguardian.com/media/2014/nov/13/google-french-arm-fines-right-to-be-forgotten.
If a proposed EU data protection regulation is passed, the fines could ranges up to 5% of a
company’s global revenue. See Julia Fioretti, Firms to Face Stiffer Fines for Breaking EU’s
“Right to Be Forgotten” Rules, REUTERS (May 20, 2015, 1:28 PM EDT), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/eu-dataprotection-fines-idUSL5N0YB23320150520.
90 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 1.
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Figure 1. Google’s Adjudication of RTBF Claims

First, Google set up a webform — available in twenty-five languages
— for people invoking the RTBF in the EU to request the removal of
links to posts containing their personal data.91 The webform was
launched by May 30, 2014, (nearly) within two weeks of the Costeja
decision.92 The webform provides detailed instructions and asks each
person to provide the following information: (1) the country whose
law applies “among the laws of the EU and EFTA Member States”; (2)
personal information including the name used to search and full name
of requester; and (3) the specific URLs the requester wants removed
from the list of results when searching for the person’s name and “[a]n
explanation, for each URL, as to how the linked web page is related to
the requester or the person represented by him/her” and “how the
inclusion of this URL as a search result is irrelevant, outdated, or
otherwise objectionable.”93 To substantiate the request, each person
must submit a copy of a document verifying his or her identity and

91 Id. at 2-3, 6; Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra
note 17.
92 Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 11.
93 Id. at 2-3.
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check a box attesting to the accuracy of the representations made.94
Google does not provide an alternative process for RTBF claims.95 Yet
it has on an ad hoc basis processed some claims submitted by fax,
letter, or email.96
Second, Google hired and assigned staff — a so-called “removals
team” — to process the requests.97 Although the precise number of
employees has not been revealed, it was somewhere under 100
employees (including paralegal assistants and other employees) in
November 2014.98 As Google explained, “We have many people
working full time on the process, and ensuring enough resources are
available for the processing of requests required a significant hiring
effort.”99
In evaluating the requests, Google staff “will look at whether the
search results in question include outdated or irrelevant information
about the data subject, as well as whether there’s a public interest in
the information.”100 Google considers several criteria, including:
(1) “the individual (for example, whether an individual is a
public figure),”
(2) “the publisher of the information (for example, whether
the link requested to be removed points to material published
by a reputable news source or government website),” and
(3) “the nature of the information available via the link (for
example, if it is political speech, if it was published by the data
subject him- or herself, or if the information pertains to the
data subject’s profession or a criminal conviction).”101
Google acknowledges, however, that “[e]ach criterion has its own
potential complications and challenges.”102 What is striking about
Google’s nonexhaustive list of criteria is that many of the factors do
not come explicitly from the CJEU’s decision. While the CJEU did
94

Id. at 3.
Id. at 7 (“We are not providing an alternative process for submitting a removal
request but we have received requests in writing by fax, letter and email.”).
96 Id. (“We generally refer these requests to the webform. However, if a requester
insists on not using the webform, we will nevertheless process his/her request.”).
97 See Schechner, Google Removing Search Results, supra note 18.
98 See McGee, supra note 19.
99 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 10.
100 Id. at 4.
101 Id.
102 Id.
95
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mention public figures as a factor that militate against a RTBF claim,103
the Court did not discuss any of the other criteria now used by
Google.104 The Court spoke generally about “the preponderant interest
of the general public in having . . . access to the information in
question.”105 But Google has developed more specific criteria
apparently based on its own interpretation of the general guidance
provided by the CJEU.
The Google staff — lawyers, paralegals, and engineers primarily
located in Dublin, Ireland, Google’s European headquarters — decide
each request balancing the factors on a case-by-case basis.106 In some
cases, Google requests more information from the requester before a
decision can be made.107 Google lawyers reportedly meet twice a week
with the team to try to ensure consistent decisions.108 The removals
team of Google staff decides the easy cases. In close cases, striking the
right balance can be difficult. Google set up a senior Google panel
consisting of “senior lawyers, engineers and product managers” who
meet typically on Wednesdays to deliberate on and decide the difficult
cases by a vote of the panelists.109 Participants of the senior panel can
appear in person or through video via Google hangouts.110 Sometimes
the senior Google panel calls in an outside expert for input.111
If the claim is rejected, Google sends a rejection notice indicating
the reason — for example, “political speech, public interest” — and

103

Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 97, 99 (May 13, 2014).
Compare id. ¶ 81 (“Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by
those articles also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that
balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in
question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the
public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according
to the role played by the data subject in public life.”), with supra text accompanying
note 100 (listing relevant factors considered by Google, including (1) the individual
(e.g., public figure); (2) the publisher (e.g., government website); and (3) the nature
of the information (e.g., political speech)).
105 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 97.
106 See Lisa Fleisher & Sam Schechner, How Google’s Top Minds Decide What to
Forget, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015, 4:20 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/howgoogles-top-minds-decide-what-to-forget-1431462018.
107 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5.
108 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion.
109 See Fleisher & Schechner, supra note 106.
110 Id.
111 Id.
104
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the right of the requester to appeal the decision to the national Data
Protection Authority.112
If the claim for removal is accepted, Google sends the requester a
notice indicating the removal of the URL.113 Google also sends a notice
of the URLs removed to any webmaster who signed up on Google’s
service to receive notices when URLs from their sites are removed
from search results for legal reasons.114 Google’s notices to the affected
webmaster do not disclose the personal data or the person who
requested the delisting.115 Google made the policy decision to notify
webmasters based on its understanding that such notices do not
contain personal data and, even if hypothetically they do contain
personal data, Google would be justified in sending notices to affected
webmasters under Article 7(c) and (f) of the Data Protection
Directive.116 In addition, for removed listings related to nonpublic
figures, Google places “a notification at the bottom of all search result
pages for queries where a name-based removal has occurred as well as
for all other search result pages that appear to be for the name of a
person, indicating that results may have been removed.”117 For
example, searching the name “George Osborne” on Google.co.uk
yields a notification informing the user that “[s]ome results may have
been removed under data protection law in Europe.”118 Google
decided not to show this notice for public figures or celebrities
because “such searches are very rarely affected by a removal, due to
the role played by these persons in public life.”119
Another key interpretation by Google was to limit the application of
Costeja to the European versions of Google services (web search,
image search, and Google News).120 Google has national versions (e.g.,
Google.fr for France) for nearly every country.121 If European users
access the U.S. version Google.com, they will be redirected to the
112

Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5.
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 6.
117 Id. at 10.
118 Online search for “George Osborne,” https://www.google.co.uk/#q=george+
osborne (last visited Aug 19, 2015) (search “George Osborne”; then scroll to bottom
of search results on first page). See generally Danny Sullivan, How Google’s New “Right
to Be Forgotten” Form Works: An Explainer, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 30, 2014, 2:54
AM), http://searchengineland.com/google-right-to-be-forgotten-form-192837.
119 Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 10.
120 See id. at 3-4, 10.
121 Id. at 3-4.
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relevant European version (unless a virtual private network masks the
geolocation of the user).122 According to Google, “[f]ewer than 5% of
European users use google.com,” a figure that Google claims is
comprised of a significant number of travelers.123 In November 2014,
the Article 29 Working Party disagreed with Google’s approach and
issued guidelines that would require search engines to remove links
on all of their domains, including Google.com.124
Google has reversed some removal decisions, apparently on an ad
hoc basis and after some public scrutiny.125 But Google appears to
provide an individual no way to request reconsideration or an appeal
within Google once it has reached its decision.126
3.

Google’s Transparency Report of RTBF Requests

Google provides a Transparency Report detailing the number of
requests it has received and their disposition.127 The Transparency
Report is updated in near real time as Google decides more requests.128
With a pie chart, Google indicates the percentage of webpages that it
has delisted from its search versus the percentage of webpages that it
has not delisted. A visitor to Google’s website can obtain the data by
country from a dropdown menu listing each country.129 As of
122

Id.
Id. at 4.
124 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of
Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131-12, at 3, 9, 14/EN WP 225
(Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf. The issue is at the center of a RTBF dispute in
France, where Google is refusing to follow the French data protection authority’s order to
extend the removal of links to Google.com. See Alex Hern, Google Says Non to French
Demand to Expand Right to Be Forgotten Worldwide, GUARDIAN (July 30, 2015, 12:00 EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/30/google-rejects-france-expand-rightto-be-forgotten-worldwide.
125 See David Drummond, We Need to Talk About the Right to Be Forgotten,
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014, 5:05 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate (“Of
course, only two months in our process is still very much a work in progress. It’s why
we incorrectly removed links to some articles last week (they’ve since been
reinstated).”).
126 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5.
127 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20.
128 See id.
129 Id.
123
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December 10, 2015, Google received approximately 356,012 requests
related to 1,261,476 links.130 Google has found in favor of removal in
approximately 42.1% of the requested webpages, a rate of acceptance
consistent with its rate as of October in 2014.131 Google has rejected
removal of 57.9% of the requested webpage links as of December
2015.132
The Transparency Report also provides twenty-three examples of
RTBF claims that Google has decided.133 For example, Google granted
the RTBF claims of several victims of crimes or their family members:
(1) “[a] woman [from Italy who] requested that we remove a decadesold article about her husband’s murder, which included her name”
and (2) “[a] victim of rape [from Germany] asked us to remove a link
to a newspaper article about the crime.”134 By contrast, Google rejected
the requests of several people requesting removal of links of articles
related to their professional or personal misconduct or criminal
activity: (1) a person from Italy made “multiple requests . . . to remove
20 links to recent articles about his arrest for financial crimes
committed in a professional capacity,”135 (2) a media professional from
the United Kingdom “requested that we remove 4 links to articles
reporting on embarrassing content he posted to the Internet,”136 and
(3) a person from the United Kingdom asked “to remove links to
articles on the internet that reference his dismissal for sexual crimes
committed on the job.”137 Sometimes, however, Google has removed
links related to crimes for which the person has been rehabilitated
under the national law.138
130 Id. (report on Dec. 10, 2015); see also Jeff John Roberts, Google Shows Sites That
Get Most ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, More Than 500K Pages Removed, FORTUNE
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/24/google-forgotten-data/ (describing
report on Nov. 24, 2015).
131 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, supra
note 20, (report on Dec. 10, 2015); Ashley Zeckman, Right to Be Forgotten: Google
Refreshes Stats, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Oct. 13, 2014), http://searchenginewatch.
com/sew/news/2375322/right-to-be-forgotten-google-refreshes-stats#.
132 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. (“A man asked that we remove a link to a news summary of a local
magistrate’s decisions that included the man’s guilty verdict. Under the U.K.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, this conviction has been spent. We have removed the
page from search results for his name.”).
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Given Google’s role as the decision maker, it is “building a rich
program of jurisprudence on the [RTBF] decision.”139
4.

Google Establishes Advisory Council on the RTBF

Google established an external Advisory Council on the Right to Be
Forgotten to seek further advice and guidance on how to decide RTBF
requests and to balance an individual’s privacy right with the public’s
right to information.140 The Council consisted of eight outside experts
from European countries, plus former CEO Eric Schmidt and Chief
Legal Officer David Drummond.141 The Council held public meetings
to discuss the RTBF in seven cities in Europe; the public meetings
were also recorded and posted for further viewing on YouTube.142
On February 6, 2015, the Advisory Council issued a forty-one page
Report.143 The Report advised Google to consider four criteria in
deciding RTBF requests: (1) the data subject’s role in public life, (2)
the nature of the information including suggestions on types of
information militating toward privacy or toward public interest, (3)
the source, and (4) the passage of time.144 The Report also advised
Google on procedural and remedial aspects of how RTBF requests are
processed and enforced. The Report recommended that Google retain
its controversial policy of notifying webmasters if their webpages have
been delisted and of limiting the geographical scope of delisting to
national versions of Google (without extension to Google.com).145
139 See Natasha Lomas, Call for Google to Show Its Right to Be Forgotten Workings,
TECHCRUNCH (May 14, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/14/call-for-google-to-show-its-right-to-be-forgottenworkings/ (quoting Peter Fleischer, Google Global Privacy Counsel).
140 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 12.
141 See Google Advisory Council, supra note 16. The experts were: Luciano Floridi,
Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of Information at the University of Oxford; Sylvie
Kauffman, Editorial Director, Le Monde; Lidia Kolucka-Zuk, Executive Director of the
Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe; Frank La Rue, UN Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression of the UNHRC; Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, former Federal
Minister of Justice in Germany; José-Luis Piñar, Professor of Law at San Pablo-CEU
University of Madrid and former Director of the Spanish Data Protection Agency
(“AEPD”); Peggy Valcke, Research Professor at University of Leuven; Jimmy Wales,
Founder and Chair Emeritus, Board of Trustees, Wikimedia Foundation. See id.
142 Id.
143 See LUCIANO FLORIDI ET AL., THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO
BE
FORGOTTEN
(2015),
available
at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/
0B1UgZshetMd4cEI3SjlvV0hNbDA/view?pli=1.
144 Id. at 7-14.
145 Id. at 17-20.
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Reporting to and Oversight by the Article 29 Working Party

Google has reported to the Article 29 Working Party, which has
monitored Google’s implementation of the RTBF.146 In July 2014, the
Working Party met with Google, Bing, and Yahoo! to learn about the
practices of the search engines in implementing the right.147 As
mentioned above, the Working Party has disagreed with several
aspects of Google’s implementation of the RTBF, particularly
regarding the way in which it limits a delisting of a link only to the
European version of Google.148
B. Other Institutions Developing the Right to Be Forgotten, Post-Costeja
Google is not alone in developing the RTBF. Several government
actors or bodies are also involved in the process. Google is operating
within a crowded field of actors. This section summarizes the key
players.
1.

Article 29 Working Party and National DPAs

The Article 29 Working Party has been the most visible institution
in providing oversight to how search engines are implementing the
RTBF.149 In July 2014, the Working Party asked Google and the other
search engines to answer questions related to their implementation of
the RTBF, both at a meeting and in writing.150 On November 26, 2014,
the Working Party issued guidelines on its view of how the RTBF
should be decided.151 The Guidelines contain thirteen criteria for
search engines to consider in processing RTBF requests.152
The national DPAs also retain the authority to regulate Google and
to review the rejections of RTBF requests by search engines if the
146

See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 1.
Press Release, Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, European DPAs Meet with
Search Engines on the “Right to Be Forgotten,” July 25, 2014, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-release/
art29_press_material/2014/20140725_wp29_press_release_right_to_be_forgotten.pdf.
148 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines, supra note 124, at 8-9.
149 See, e.g., Amy Gesenhues, EU Says Process for Reviewing Right to Be Forgotten
Appeals Is Working, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 18, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://
searchengineland.com/eu-says-process-for-reviewing-right-to-be-forgotten-appeals-isworking-223548.
150 See Responding to Article 29 Working Party’s Questions, supra note 21; see also
note 147 and accompanying text.
151 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines, supra note 124, at 1.
152 Id. at 13-20.
147
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claimants appeal. A few DPAs have published results from appeals of
Google’s decisions; the number of appeals is very low.153 France’s DPA
ordered Google to apply its removal of links for successful claimants
to Google’s search engine worldwide, but Google has yet to comply.154
2.

National Courts and CJEU

Individuals can pursue RTBF claims in national courts after first
seeking relief with the search engine and then, if necessary, seek an
appeal with the national DPA, as in Costeja.155 The national courts
decide the dispute and may also refer a legal issue regarding the EU
right to be forgotten to the Court of Justice. Thus far, it is too early to
tell what percentage of the thousands of rejections by Google will be
appealed to national DPAs or the courts. The low rate of appeals of
Google’s rejections to national DPAs thus far suggests that the rate of
lawsuits in court will be even lower.156
In one such appeal, the Court of Amsterdam upheld Google’s decision
not to remove links to articles about the 2012 conviction of a man who
ran an escort service and was convicted for “attempted incitement of
contract killing.”157 The Court of Amsterdam ruled that the information
related to the defendant’s conviction of a serious crime will necessarily
153 See, e.g., Sophie Curtis, EU ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: One Year On, TELEGRAPH (May
13, 2015, 6:00 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/11599909/
EU-right-to-be-forgotten-one-year-on.html (U.K.’s Information Commissioner’s Office
(“ICO”) received 183 appeals of Google’s rejections; ICO agreed with 74% of Google’s
decisions and disagreed with 26% (48)); Adrian Weckler, Bankers and Convicts Among
2,300 Irish ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, INDEPENDENT (April 30, 2015),
http://www.independent.ie/business/technology/bankers-and-convicts-among-2300irish-right-to-be-forgotten-requests-31182796.html
(Ireland’s
Data
Protection
Commissioner (“DPC”) received only thirty appeals of Google’s decisions related to
2,300 requests to remove 7,150 links to articles (of which Google rejected
approximately 71%); DPC agreed with some of Google’s decisions, but disagreed with
other decisions and rectified them with Google).
154 See Google Clashes with French Data Regulator, BBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34312698; Sam Schechner, French Privacy
Watchdog Orders Google to Expand ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2015,
8:08 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/french-privacy-watchdog-orders-google-toexpand-right-to-be-forgotten-1434098033.
155 Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 77–79 (May 13, 2014).
156 Some national data protection authorities have reported resolving some of the
appeals they received. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
157 See Joran Spauwen & Jens van den Brink, Dutch Google Spain Ruling: More
Freedom of Speech, Less Right to Be Forgotten for Criminals, INFORRM’S BLOG (Sept. 27,
2014) (internal quotations marks omitted), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/
09/27/dutch-google-spain-ruling-more-freedom-of-speech-less-right-to-be-forgottenfor-criminals-joran-spauwen-and-jens-van-den-brink/.
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remain “relevant” and “will only be ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily
defamatory’ [to justify a RTBF claim] in very exceptional cases, for
instance when the offense committed is brought up again without a
clear reason, apparently for no other purpose than to damage the
individual involved, if reporting is not factual but rather a ‘slangingmatch.’”158 The Court of Amsterdam interpreted the Costeja decision in
a narrow manner, ruling that “[t]he . . . judgment does not intend to
protect individuals against all negative communications on the Internet,
but only against ‘being pursued’ for a long time by ‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’
or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expressions.”159 Other national courts
could take more expansive approaches. The CJEU will likely be asked to
clarify the scope of the RTBF in future cases.
3.

EU Commission, EU Council, and EU Parliament

The EU’s executive and legislative bodies are also important players
in the development of the RTBF. Back in January 2012, even before
the Costeja decision, the EU Commission proposed the adoption of the
EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which would
replace the current Directive and establish a uniform EU law that
applies directly in all EU members.160 The EU Parliament and Council
agreed on the text of the GDPR in December 2015, and a formal vote
is expected early in 2016.161
One of the key provisions is the right to be forgotten.162 The GDPR
characterizes the right as the “right to be forgotten and to erasure.”163
The proposed Article 17 lists several grounds justifying a claim of
erasure, including:
(a) “the data are no longer necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise
processed;”

158

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
160 See Jan Philipp Albrecht, EU General Data Protection Regulation: State of Play
and 10 Main Issues, GREENS/EFA 1 (Jan. 7, 2015), available at http://
www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Data_protection_state_of_play_10
_points_010715.pdf.
161 See Richard Dickinson et al., General Data Protection Regulation — Terms
Agreed, “One Continent, One Law,” LEXOLOGY (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=66397735-d41e-47e0-8282-25b9197a469f.
162 Id. at 2.
163 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 14, § 3.4.3.3, at 9.
159
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(b) “the data subject withdraws consent on which the
processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or
when the storage period consented to has expired, and where
there is no other legal ground for the processing of the data;”
(c) “the data subject objects to the processing of personal
data pursuant to Article 19;”
(d) “the processing of the data does not comply with this
Regulation for other reasons.”164
Article 17(3) recognizes that erasure is not justified, however, if “the
retention of the personal data is necessary” for the following reasons:
(a)

freedom of expression under Article 80;

(b) the public interest “in the area of public health in
accordance with Article 81;”
(c) “historical, statistical and scientific research purposes in
accordance with Article 83;”
(d) “compliance with a legal obligation to retain the
personal data by Union or Member State law to which the
controller is subject; Member State laws shall meet an
objective of public interest, respect the essence of the right to
the protection of personal data and be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued;” and
(e) “in the cases referred to in paragraph 4,” which lists four
other situations.165
Even if the Council passes the Regulation, a period of transition will
likely be needed before the Regulation goes into effect.166 The
continuing debate over the GDPR underscores how much the right to
be forgotten is still under development.

164 Id. art. 17(1), at 51-52. The EU Parliament’s version of the Regulation has slight
variations from the Commission’s proposal, including an additional reason for
denying a request: “a court or regulatory authority based in the Union has ruled as
final and absolute that the data concerned must be erased.” See Memorandum,
European Comm’n, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform Now Irreversible
Following European Parliament Vote (Mar. 12, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-14-186_en.htm.
165 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 14, art. 17(3), at 52.
166 Id. art. 91, at 99 (proposed Article 91 allows a two-year transitional period).
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III. THE THEORY OF THE PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
This Part sets forth a theory to explain the concept of the private
administrative agency and why such agencies have grown especially in
the Internet context. Private administrative agencies are private
entities — for-profit corporations, nonprofit entities, and other nongovernmental organizations — that perform public functions meant to
serve the public at large by a formal or informal delegation of power
from the government.167 Google’s role in developing the right to be
forgotten is perhaps the apex of power for a private administrative
agency. Google has assumed a primary role in shaping a fundamental
individual right that applies in 32 countries.168
A. The Public Administrative Agency
The twentieth century witnessed the rise of the modern
administrative state.169 The following section briefly describes some of
the main attributes and functions of administrative agencies — i.e.,
what makes an administrative agency an agency. Applying a
comparative law approach, the section includes discussion of both
U.S. and EU administrative law to elaborate general principles that are
relevant for understanding my concept of the private administrative
agency.170

167

See infra Part III.B.1.
In addition to the 28 members of the EU, Google also has extended the right to 4
other countries in the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
and Switzerland). See Loek Essers, Europe Wants Google to Expand ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
Censorship to Global Search, PC WORLD (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:16 AM), http://www.
pcworld.com/article/2852792/eu-wants-google-to-apply-right-to-be-forgotten-delistingsto-global-com-domain.html.
169 In the United States, the explosion of agencies corresponded with the New Deal
program. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-4
(6th ed. 2011). Some scholars place the origins of the administrative state in the
United States back to the nineteenth century. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Foreword, The
American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the First One Hundred
Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 982 (2010).
170 The choice of U.S. and EU law is based on the expectation that Google’s lawyers
and policymakers who are implementing the right to be forgotten are likely to have
been influenced by U.S. and EU concepts of law. The discussion also draws from
comparative law methods to distill elements that may be worth considering in this
transnational context.
168
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Delegation of Authority

A key component of the administrative agency is the delegation of
government power from the executive or legislature to the agency to
perform a regulatory function. Indeed, the term “agency” itself implies
a delegation from one actor to another. A basic question of
administrative law is how much power and discretion can the
government delegate to an agency. U.S. scholarship has dwelt on this
issue and the related non-delegation doctrine, which, as an application
of separation of powers inherent in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has sparingly used to invalidate some delegations of power.171 In
the past, the EU recognized a non-delegation doctrine that imposed
stricter limits on what powers can be delegated to an EU agency.172
But the Court of Justice’s decision in ESMA-shortselling adopted a
more permissive approach to delegating powers to EU agencies, which
have grown in number to over 40 agencies.173 Theorists often lament
expansive delegations of power to agencies “without an explicit,
constitution-based authorization by the people.”174 Nonetheless,
“agencification” — the creation of and delegation of powers to
agencies — continues to increase, especially now in the EU.175
Delegations of power to agencies can be express or implied. For
example, the legislature can pass a law that expressly gives an agency
the power to interpret a statute and to issue rules regarding its
interpretation.176 Alternatively, the legislature might enact a law that
establishes an agency, but without specifying such an interpretative
power.177 The agency, however, might understand its statutory
171 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1177-85 (1999).
172 See Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the
EU Should Learn from American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 9-10 (2004).
173 See Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain v. European Parliament
(ESMA-shortselling), 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0270, ¶¶ 53–55 (Jan. 22, 2014);
Miroslava Scholten & Marloes van Rijsbergen, The Limits of Agencification in the
European Union, 15 GERMAN L.J. 1223, 1249-51 (2014); see also Agencies and Other EU
Bodies, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2015).
174 See, e.g., Scholten & van Rijsbergen, supra note 173, at 1224.
175 See id. at 1223-25.
176 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation.”).
177 See, e.g., id. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit.”).

2016]

Recognizing Rights in Real Time

1051

directive to include an implied power to engage in such
interpretation.178
2.

Administration of Public Functions

With their delegation of power, administrative agencies perform a
variety of administrative duties in a myriad of contexts. Some of the
more common functions include (i) lawmaking through interpretation
and rulemaking, (ii) investigation, information gathering, and
enforcement, (iii) developing expertise for the administration of
public functions, and (iv) adjudication. Each function is discussed in
turn. Fleshing out these functions here will be useful in later analyzing
Google’s role in the RTBF.
a.

Lawmaking: Rules, Interpretations, and Guidance

One important function of administrative agencies in the United
States is the exercise of lawmaking power.179 The lawmaking power
may arise from the legislature’s grant of authority to the agency to
interpret and fill in gaps in a statute that regulates the field that the
agency oversees.180 Sometimes the delegation of lawmaking power is
expressly recognized in the statute (making the agency’s
interpretations entitled to Chevron deference from the courts181), while
other times it is only implied.182 In the United States, the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires legislative rules (i.e.,
administrative rules that are binding law) to be instituted through a
procedure of public notice and a period for public comment.183
Agencies often engage in other interpretative tasks that fall short of the
issuance of legislative rules, yet these agency interpretations can
nonetheless provide important guidance about the meaning of the law

178 Under U.S. law, agency interpretations emanating from an implied power are
less likely to be entitled to so-called Chevron deference, whereas interpretations from
an express power are usually entitled to such deference. United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001); see also Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux:
Mead and the Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678-79
(2002) (explaining difference of express and implied delegation under Mead).
179 See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 142 (2011).
180 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
181 See id. at 843-44.
182 Id. at 843.
183 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 893, 893 (2004).
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in the agency’s views. For example, an agency can issue “circulars,
advice letters, guidance documents, staff manuals, and the like.”184
By contrast, although the EU administrative state is still evolving,
EU agencies typically lack formal power to engage in lawmaking.185
EU agencies do not engage in formal policymaking, but instead serve
advisory functions and can issue guidance and other “soft law”
recommendations to the EU Commission.186 Some of the agencies
exercise “strong recommendatory power,” making recommendations
that “carry considerable weight” with the Commission.187 Paul Craig
describes these “quasi-regulatory agencies” as increasingly more
common in the EU.188 The European Food Safety Authority and the
European Medicines Agency “provide technical and scientific
assistance that is the basis for a decision made by the Commission,”
for example.189
b.

Investigation, Information Gathering, and Enforcement

Agencies also perform investigations and information gathering. For
example, in the United States, after an employee files a charge of
discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) conducts an investigation to determine if there is
reasonable cause to support the claim.190 The Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) investigates insider trading of stocks.191 In other
contexts, the Federal Bureau Investigation (“FBI”) investigates
whether federal crimes have been committed, and the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) investigates tax fraud.192 Relatedly, agencies
often are charged with enforcement responsibilities, that is, to make
184

Manning, supra note 183, at 893.
See Scholten & van Rijsbergen, supra note 173, at 1231-32; Peter Strauss et al.,
EU Rulemaking, AM. BAR, 84-85 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/eu/RulemakingFinal31008.authcheckdam.pdf.
186 See PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 149-50 (2d ed. 2012); Scholten & van
Rijsbergen, supra note 173, at 1231-33; Strauss et al., supra note 185, at 85-86.
187 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 150-51.
188 See id. at 150-51.
189 Id. at 149.
190 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
191 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2015); see also Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider
Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 665, 672-73 (1988).
192 See, e.g., Anthony R. Gordon, A Day in the Life of an FBI Agent, 5 NEV. LAW. 28,
28 (1997); Edward D. Urquhart & Susan Schwyn Martinez, In Memoriam, Handling
Investigations Involving Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 193, 209
(2003).
185
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sure entities and individuals comply with the law and regulations.193
EU agencies typically have fewer formal powers in terms of
investigation and enforcement, but they do commonly provide
information and studies to the EU Commission.194
c.

Developing Expertise for the Administration of Important Public
Functions

More generally, agencies are established to develop expertise in a
certain area that requires the administration of tasks related to
important public functions.195 The basic idea is to establish an
institution with the proper expertise to tackle complex problems in a
certain field, on an ongoing basis.196 Agencies develop expertise, in
other words. One U.S. scholar described the development of expertise
(i.e. “the competence theme”) as, “several interrelated concepts
developed in response to institutional failings during the Great
Depression: institutional expertise, administrative agencies’ political
and epistemic independence, and experts’ capacity to use law to
optimize citizens’ well-being.”197 Or, as the EU Commission stated,
agencies “would make the executive more effective at [the] European
level in highly specialized technical areas requiring advanced expertise
and continuity, credibility and visibility of public action.”198 Agencies
are often assigned to certain fields of regulation that are important for
society: food and drug safety, environmental protection, workplace
safety, national security, intellectual property, telecommunications,
trade, banking, and financial institutions.199

193 See, e.g., Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive
Demands and Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347, 351-52 (2008) (discussing SEC
enforcement); Urquhart & Martinez, supra note 192, at 231-32 (discussing IRS
enforcement).
194 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 152.
195 See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Factual Premises of Statutory Interpretation in
Agency Review Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366, 391 (2009) (discussing how agencies
can deploy their expertise to better parse facts in specialized cases).
196 See id.
197 Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process School’s “Institutional
Competence” Theme: Unintended Consequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1045, 1054 (2006).
198 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 143 & n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199 See id. at 144-45.
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Adjudication and Rendering of Decisions

Another important role of agencies is adjudication — the rendering
of individualized decisions on a disputed matter that binds the parties
involved. In the United States, adjudication by agencies is quite
common; in fact, “[a]dministrative agencies adjudicate massive
numbers of individual disputes, far exceeding the number resolved by
courts.”200 In such adjudication, an agency has broad discretion to
develop what is essentially agency case law.201 Whereas an agency’s
rulemaking can be likened to legislation, an agency’s adjudication can
be likened to court decisions.202 Although fewer EU agencies have
powers to adjudicate claims or disputes, several of them do — for
example, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market
(“OHIM”), the Community Plant Variety Office (“CPVO”), and the
European Aviation Safety Agency (“EASA”).203
B. The Private Administrative Agency
1.

Definition

Under the traditional conception of the administrative agency, an
agency arises from delegation of some power from the legislature or
sometimes the executive to handle administration of some tasks.204
The agency is public in at least two important senses: (i) it derives its
authority or responsibility for administration of certain tasks from the
elected branches of government and (ii) it performs public functions
that are meant to serve the public or society at large.205 However,
private entities — including for-profit corporations, non-profit
organizations, and other nongovernmental organizations — could
conceivably perform the same public roles. Much of the privatization

200 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 693, 693 (2005).
201 Id. at 698.
202 See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 106 (2003).
203 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 149-50.
204 See CASS ET AL., supra note 169, at 3.
205 See id. at 6 (describing public interest view of agencies); see also Shiv Narayan
Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and Law Enforcement Agencies: A
Question of Civil Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77, 81 (2013) (“For, once the
legislature clearly defines agency standards, the delegated authority is intended to
operate for and serve the public good.”).
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debate revolves around the legitimacy and desirability of
“outsourcing” such public functions to private entities.206
For the purposes of this Article, a private administrative agency is
defined as a non-governmental entity that (i) derives its authority or
responsibility for administration of certain tasks through a formal or
informal delegation of power by the government and (ii) performs
public functions that are meant to serve the public or society at
large.207 If a private entity satisfies both elements, then it can be
classified as a private administrative agency. Before analyzing Google
(in Part IV), the following discussion sets forth a theoretical basis for
envisioning such entities as private administrative agencies.208
2.

Weber and Bureaucratic Organizations

My conception of the private administrative agency draws upon the
theory of Max Weber, the sociological theorist perhaps best known for
his theory of bureaucracy.209 What is common to both public and

206 See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural
Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 531-32 (2011) (“[T]he mere fact that one
entity is created by congressional statute and the other is borne of private sector
initiative may be too slender a reed on which to determine the entirety of
constitutional doctrine related to the outsourcing of federal powers.”).
207 Delegations of power to private administrative agencies can be categorized
based on whether the delegation of power was express or implied. However, in order
to avoid confusion with delegations of power to public administrative agencies, which
are all typically established by statutes, this Article will use the terms “formal” and
“informal” to classify the types of delegations to private administrative agencies.
Formal delegation to a private administrative agency means that the government has
entered into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or other written document
that indicates its delegation to or reliance on a private entity for administering certain
responsibilities. By contrast, an informal delegation means that the government has
delegated to or relied on a private entity for administering certain responsibilities, but
without a formal document spelling out in detail the relationship.
208 The term “private administrative agency” appears to have gained popularity, if
not to have originated, in U.S. legal scholarship related to judicially created structures
designed to handle the settlements of class actions. These structures were
characterized as temporary, or private, administrative agencies. See Martha Minow,
Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative
Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2019-26 (1997) (discussing judicially created
“temporary administrative agencies”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and
Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1165
n.73 (1998) (“These settlements also involve judicial approval of the creation of what
are in effect private administrative agencies.” (citing Minow, supra)).
209 See S. Michael Hare, Toward a Multidimensional Model of Social Interaction as
Related to Conflict Resolution Theory, 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 803, 816 (2002).
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private administrative agencies is their bureaucratic organization.210 A
bureaucracy is a rational form of modern authority that is “grounded
in laws and wielded by administrative structure capable of enforcing
clear and consistent rules.”211 As Weber postulated, the bureaucracy
becomes a form of domination that is based on the “belief in the
validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally
created rules.”212 Bureaucratic organizations form a way to structure
responsibilities in the most efficient manner in a capitalist state.213
A key insight of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is that it applies to
government and private institutions alike:
The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all
bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as
well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It
does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its
authority is called “private” or “public.”214
....
Office management, at least all specialized office management
— and such management is distinctly modern — usually
presupposes thorough training in a field of specialization. This,
too, holds increasingly for the modern executive and employee of a
private enterprise, just as it does for the state officials.215
Bureaucratic organization “is formally capable of application to all
kinds of administrative tasks,” whether public or private.216 “The first
such basis of bureaucratization has been the quantitative extension of

210

See MOISÉS NAÍM, THE END OF POWER 40-41 (2013).
Id. at 40.
212 See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
79 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY].
213 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 223 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Bedminster Press 1968) [hereinafter ECONOMY AND SOCIETY] (“[F]rom a purely
technical point of view, [a bureaucracy is] capable of attaining the highest degree of
efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising
authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability,
in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a
particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and
for those acting in relation to it.”).
214 Id. at 957.
215 Id. at 958 (emphasis added).
216 See id. at 223.
211
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administrative tasks,”217 which often relate to “social welfare
policies.”218
Thus, under Weber’s theory, viewing a corporation like Google as
the same type of bureaucratic organization as a government agency
would be natural.219 “Normally, the very large, modern capitalist
enterprises are themselves unequalled models of strict bureaucratic
organization.”220 Thus, the choice is not between public and private
organizations.221 Instead, “[t]he choice is only that between
bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration.”222 The
bureaucratic form of governance mirrors the rational ordering that
developed for industrialization and capitalism.223
The Internet itself may be a facilitator of bureaucracies. Although
writing in the beginning of the twentieth century, Weber also
recognized the role that modern communication (e.g., the telegraph)
served as “pacemakers of bureaucratization.”224 He believed modern
communication required at least some public administration, just as
public roads and waterways did.225 In a line that is no less true today,
Weber argued that “[a] certain degree of development of the means of
communication in turn is one of the most important prerequisites for
the possibility of bureaucratic administration, though it alone is not
decisive.”226 Thus, it should not be surprising how adept Google is at
administration. Google developed the most popular search engine for
the Internet, enabling millions of people to find information online.227
217

Id. at 969.
Id. at 972-73.
219 See id. at 980 (“The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the
concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master. This
concentration occurs, for instance, in a well-known and typical fashion in the
development of big capitalist enterprises, which find their essential characteristics in this
process. A corresponding process occurs in public organizations.” (emphasis added)).
220 WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 212, at 215.
221 See Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 38 (2007)
(“Rather, the basic choice is between two kinds of bureaucracy, which really do not
differ much at all.”).
222 See WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 213, at 223.
223 Chantal Thomas, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Legal Reform:
A Reassessment with Implications for Law and Development, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 383, 394
& n.61 (2006) (citing WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 212, at 214); see also
WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 212, at 214-15.
224 See WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 213, at 973.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See Worldwide Market Share of Leading Search Engines from January 2010 to
October 2015, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market218
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Google can be viewed as a pacemaker of bureaucratization. The role
that Google serves in its core business of search is inherently a public
role as an administrator of a vital service related to the most important
means of mass communication today, the Internet.
Of course, Weber was also skeptical of the social effects of
bureaucratization and the modern economic order, which might
become the so-called “iron cage” that traps individuals in a highly
structured order that is too hard to escape.228 For our purposes, it is
sufficient to table these concerns and instead focus on Weber’s general
theory of bureaucratic organizations. Weber’s theory provides a
theoretical foundation through which to view certain private entities
as administrative agencies.
3.

Coase, Transaction Costs, and Outsourcing

Once we understand the term “administrative agency” as applying
equally to public and private entities based on their bureaucratic
organization to handle certain public tasks, we need a theory to
explain why governments might delegate some public tasks to private
instead of public agencies.
The theory of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase
provides one answer. Coase developed a theory to explain why firms
integrate some tasks internally, while leaving other tasks to dealings
with other entities (such as suppliers).229 According to Coase, vertical
integration within the firm occurs as a way to deal with transaction
costs.230 A firm can reduce transaction costs by bringing some
responsibilities in-house, while outsourcing others.231 Coase’s theory
of vertical integration has application beyond businesses. As Moisés
Naím explains:
share-of-search-engines/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (aggregating data continuously).
228 See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 123
(Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 2001) (1930) (explaining how modern economic
order results in an “iron cage” for those born into it).
229 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937).
230 See id.; see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
“Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 612 (1989) (“The essence of Coase’s argument, which
he first developed in his twenties in The Nature of the Firm, is that transaction costs
are large and that economic actors tend to arrange their institutions with an eye to
these costs.”).
231 See NAÍM, supra note 210, at 44 (“The propensity to operate through a vertically
integrated firm is driven by the structure of the market of buyers and sellers active in
the different stages of the industry and by the kinds of investments needed to enter the
business. In short, transaction costs determine the contours, growth patterns, and,
ultimately, the very nature of firms.”).
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The idea that transaction costs determine the size and even the
nature of an organization can be applied to many other fields
beyond industry to explain why not just modern corporations
but also government agencies, armies, and churches became
large and centralized. In all such cases, it has been rational and
efficient to do so.232
Thus, governments are faced with the same basic question of
integration as businesses confront — whether to bring responsibilities
in-house or to outsource them. The privatization debate — whether
for social services,233 police,234 prisons,235 security forces,236 or other
functions — raises this basic question.237 One way to answer this
question is for the government to compare the transactions costs of
keeping the responsibilities in-house versus the costs of outsourcing
them.238 Of course, where important public interests and values are at
stake, governments should consider more than simply transaction
costs.239 But economic analysis can provide at least an explanation, if
not justification, for why governments might outsource some tasks to
private actors.240 It may be more efficient to do so.
4.

Mixed Administration, Co-Regulation, and Global
Administrative Law

The final component to my theory of the private administrative
agency comes from administrative law scholarship. My theory of the
232

Id.
See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative
Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 821 (2000) [hereinafter New Administrative Law].
234 See Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159,
163 (2012); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1176
(1999).
235 See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 902-04 (2004).
236 Id. at 907-09.
237 See generally Freeman, New Administrative Law, supra note 233 (discussing
public-private arrangements); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549 (2000) [hereinafter Private Role] (“In an era of contracting
out, it behooves administrative law scholars to pay closer attention to contract as a
vehicle for the exercise of authority and as an instrument of regulation.”).
238 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389,
404-06 (2003) (proposing transaction cost analysis for determining whether to
outsource government regulation).
239 See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government
Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 449-66 (2006).
240 See Shapiro, supra note 238, at 404-06.
233
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private administrative agency fits within and builds on the concepts of
mixed administration in the United States, co-regulation in Europe,
and global administrative law.
In 2000, Professor Jody Freeman conceptualized private actors as
participants in the administration of agency responsibilities under a
form of “mixed administration.” According to Freeman,
“[c]ontemporary regulation might be best described as a regime of
‘mixed administration’ in which private actors and government share
regulatory roles.”241 Her approach canvassed different examples.242 By
examining various examples of mixed administration (such as in
social services, standard setting, and prisons), Freeman shows that
“[p]rivate individuals, private firms, financial institutions, public
interest organizations, domestic and international standard-setting
bodies, professional associations, labor unions, business networks,
advisory boards, expert panels, self-regulating organizations, and nonprofit groups all help to perform many of the regulatory functions
that, at least in legal theory, we assume agencies perform alone.”243
Freeman acknowledges the potential dangers to democratic
accountability that private actors pose in mixed administration, but
she also argues that “alternative accountability mechanisms” (e.g.,
market forces, norms, internal procedures) may chasten private actors
in their exercise of discretion.244 Moreover, private actors may provide
distinct benefits by contributing “to the efficacy and legitimacy of
administration.”245 Freeman calls for the adoption of “aggregate
accountability” measures — including “informal, nontraditional, and
nongovernmental mechanisms for ensuring accountability.”246
Beginning in the late 1980s, Australian and then European scholars
developed a theory of “co-regulation,” in which “a body with statutory
regulatory authority delegates to the relevant industry responsibility
for maintaining and applying a code of practice that the statutory
regulator has approved, continuing to oversee the co-regulation, with
retained powers to intervene where necessary.”247 Co-regulation is
viewed as a form of governance (instead of government) that

241

Freeman, New Administrative Law, supra note 233, at 816.
Id. at 820 (discussing examples of areas of mixed administration).
243 Id. at 817.
244 Id. at 819.
245 Id.
246 Freeman, Private Role, supra note 237, at 665.
247 CHRISTOPHER
T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE 54-55 (2011).
242

LAW,
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combines public and private actors.248 It contrasts with self-regulation
in which private actors are not constrained by government oversight.
The EU has formally recognized co-regulation as a legitimate type of
governance in the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better LawMaking.249 Proponents of co-regulation contend that it offers
advantages in affording flexibility to private actors to implement a
public goal or service recognized by law.250 The UK Better Regulation
Executive even argued that “[c]o-regulatory initiatives are more likely
to be successful as those being regulated have scope to use their
experience to design and implement their own solutions.”251
What distinguishes my concept of private administrative agency
from the theories of mixed administration and co-regulation is my
focus on the private entity involved. Both mixed administration and
co-regulation describe the broader relationship between government
and private entity,252 whereas my concept of the private administrative
agency hones in on the private entity itself. Mixed administration and
co-regulation are helpful in pointing out the existence of multiple
actors, public and private, that are involved in certain forms of
governance and regulation. My theory focuses on the nature, function,
or structure of the private entity, particularly in how it fulfills its role
as a regulator: some private entities operate as administrative agencies,
displaying some of the same attributes and performing the same
functions as government agencies. Although private administrative
agencies are not the same species as public agencies, they are within
the same genus.
The final additional theoretical component relates to the global scale
of Google. Professors Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard
Stewart, and others have developed a growing body of scholarship on
what they characterize as global administrative law, which is defined
“as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting
248

Id. at 55.
European Parliament Council Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on
Better Law-making, 2003 O.J. (C 321) 1, 3 (“Co-regulation means the mechanism
whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined
by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such as
economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations, or
associations).”).
250 See MARSDEN, supra note 247, at 58-59 (discussing such claims).
251 Id. at 58-59 (quoting U.K. Better Regulation Executive (2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
252 See generally id. at 46-47 (discussing state and private actors working together
in regulation); Freeman, New Administrative Law, supra note 233, at 853-54
(discussing interplay of public and private actors).
249
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social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the
accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation,
reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of
the rules and decisions they make.”253
Global administrative law is similar to theories of mixed
administration and co-regulation in that global administrative law also
describes more fluid relationships among public and private actors in a
field of regulation than the traditional state actor.254 The big
difference, however, is that global administrative law focuses on fields
of regulation that have been elevated to the transnational or
international level.255 The problems associated with globalized
interdependence “cannot be addressed effectively by isolated national
regulatory and administrative measures.”256 Regulatory power is
shifted from national governments to other entities that have a more
global reach, including “[g]lobal administrative bodies” such as
“formal
intergovernmental
regulatory
bodies,
informal
intergovernmental
regulatory
networks
and
coordination
arrangements, national regulatory bodies operating with reference to
an international intergovernmental regime, hybrid public-private
regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory bodies exercising
transnational
governance
functions
of
particular
public
significance.”257 As we shall see in Part IV, add to this list: Google.
C. Private Administrative Agencies in the Internet Context
Private entities ranging from associations and nonprofits to forprofit corporations administer a variety of functions that serve the
public at large in the Internet context. These private entities can be
viewed as private administrative agencies in the ways in which they

253 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005).
254 Cf. id. at 16 (“Underlying the emergence of global administrative law is the vast
increase in the reach and forms of transgovernmental regulation and administration
designed to address the consequences of globalized interdependence in such fields as
security, the conditions on development and financial assistance to developing
countries, environmental protection, banking and financial regulation, law
enforcement, telecommunications, trade in products and services, intellectual
property, labor standards, and cross-border movements of populations, including
refugees.”).
255 See id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 17.
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wield regulatory power, process disputes, and interpret and apply legal
rules. This section explains why private administrative agencies may
be common in the Internet context.
1.

Decentralized Nature of the Internet

The Internet context may be especially conducive for private
administrative agencies to develop. The history of the Internet shows
how it developed into a decentralized international network that was
not under the control of governments.258 The Internet developed with
a laissez faire approach, which eschewed intrusive regulations by
governments.259 In several case studies, Christopher Marsden has
documented how co-regulation between public and private actors is a
popular occurrence in the Internet context.260
The Internet started out in the 1960s as a project of the U.S.
Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency
(“DARPA”), which created a military network called the ARPANET.261
DARPA eventually turned control over the ARPANET to the National
Science Foundation (“NSF”).262 NSF developed the network into
NSFNet, which was broadened for use outside the military by
academics and researchers.263 NSF outsourced a good deal of the
upgrade and expansion of the network and the Internet backbones to
telecom companies, IBM, and the state of Michigan.264 In 1992, as the
number of users and networks connected to the NSFNet grew, NSF
decided to turn over management of the network’s technical
administration to public and private entities.265 Finally, in 1995, NSF
stopped funding the network and it became the Internet — a
decentralized, privately operated network whose equipment and
258 See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global
Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1993) (describing the history of the
Internet).
259 See John H. Pearson, Foreword, Regulation in the Face of Technological Advance:
Who Makes These Calls Anyway?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (1999).
260 See MARSDEN, supra note 247, at 221.
261 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741, 31741
(June 10, 1998).
262 See id. at 31742.
263 See Marcus Maher, Note, An Analysis of Internet Standardization, 3 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 5, 8 (1998).
264 See Haran Craig Rashes, The Impact of Telecommunication Competition and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 on Internet Service Providers, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 49, 52 (1997).
265 See Van N. Nguy, Comment, Using Architectural Constraints and Game Theory to
Regulate International Cyberspace Behavior, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 431, 435-36 (2004).
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governance were dispersed among various private actors, companies,
and entities.266
Once NSF unleashed the Internet from U.S. government oversight,
private investment in the Internet exploded.267 So did the number of
Internet users, which went from approximately 26 million in 1995 to
400 million in 2000, an increase of more than 15 times over.268 During
this time, President Clinton and Vice President Gore set forth a vision
of the Internet that was guided by a laissez faire approach by
governments.269 As Clinton said, “[b]ecause the Internet has such
explosive potential for prosperity, it should be a global free-trade zone.
It should be a place where Government makes every effort first, as the
Vice President said, not to stand in the way, to do no harm . . . . We
want to encourage the private sector to regulate itself as much as
possible.”270 The Internet, when released from U.S. government
control, evolved into a decentralized, private network of international
scale. The U.S. government decided to favor a laissez faire or nonregulatory approach to the Internet, viewing with skepticism intrusive
government regulations.271 While other countries were not obliged to
follow the same approach as the United States, it became a popular
approach among many countries around the world.272
2.

Example: ICANN Nonprofit and the Domain Name System

The most well-known example of a private administrative agency in
the Internet context is the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names
and Numbers (“ICANN”), which regulates the entire Domain Name
System (“DNS”) for the Internet.273 The delegation of power to ICANN
resulted from President Clinton’s 1997 directive to privatize the
266 See Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 261 (2003).
267 See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001).
268 See id. at 25 n.77.
269 See William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce
Initiative (July 1, 1997), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1997-0707/pdf/WCPD-1997-07-07-Pg1003.pdf.
270 Id.
271 See Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of
Internet Regulation, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 445, 450-52 (2001); Clinton, supra note 269.
272 Eko, supra note 271, at 451 (“This self-regulation model soon became the de
facto Internet regulation standard at the national and international levels.”).
273 See Daniela Michele Spencer, Note, Much Ado About Nothing: ICANN’s New
GTLDs, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 868-69 (2014).
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Internet.274 In 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce entered into
an agreement with the newly formed non-profit organization ICANN
to delegate to ICANN the authority over the DNS and the operation of
the root server system that enables domain names to identify unique
addresses for websites on the Internet.275 However, the delegation of
power to ICANN is subject to renewal, and the Department of
Commerce retains ultimate control over the authoritative root file for
the Internet.276 Whether the U.S. government should continue to
retain this ultimate authority remains controversial.277 The Obama
Administration considered ways to pass control over the root to a
nongovernmental international group of representatives, but, in
December 2014, Congress passed an amendment to the budget bill
that prevents the Commerce Department from using any funding “to
relinquish the responsibility . . . with respect to Internet domain name
system functions, including responsibility with respect to the
authoritative root zone file.”278
Although critics have attacked the U.S. government’s delegation of
power to ICANN on numerous grounds,279 what is striking about it for
our purposes is that the delegation of power to ICANN was formalized
by written contract.280 The U.S. government made a conscious
decision to privatize the oversight for the domain name system and
formally to delegate power to a nonprofit organization.
Given this formal delegation of power, ICANN can be viewed as a
private administrative agency. ICANN functions as an administrative
agency in overseeing the DNS and developing policies related to it. For
example, ICANN holds public meetings that “are free and open to

274 Joseph D. Schleimer, Protecting Copyrights at the “Backbone” Level of the Internet,
15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 139, 154 (2008).
275 Id.
276 Id. at 155.
277 See, e.g., Larry Seltzer, Congress Blocks ICANN Transition. Good., ZDNET (Dec.
17, 2014, 5:00 PST), http://www.zdnet.com/article/congress-blocks-icann-transitiongood/.
278 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 540(a), 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); see also Thomas Lifson, Congress
Quietly Saved Internet Freedom in CROmnibus, AM. THINKER (Dec. 22, 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted), http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/12/congress_
quietly_saved_internet_freedom_in_cromnibus.html.
279 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) (discussing ICANN
and its delegated authority).
280 See Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce’s Contract Delegation of Power to
ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2 (2002).
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all.”281 It publishes proposals that are subject to public comment for at
least 40 days.282 Some of its proposals, such as the policy to create new
generic top level domains, ICANN’s Board votes on and approves.283
ICANN has also promulgated the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) that applies to all registered domain
names.284 The UDRP is akin to a rulemaking by a public agency. It
offers a form of alternative dispute resolution for trademark owners to
deal with the problem of cyber-squatting or bad faith registrations of
domain names containing trademarks.285 UDRP claims are decided by
a panel of lawyers assigned by the World Intellectual Property
Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center, which itself can be
considered a private administrative agency that serves a quasiadjudicative role.
ICANN is but one of numerous examples of a private administrative
agency that serves important public functions in the Internet
context.286 As Part IV explains, Google is as well.
IV. GOOGLE AS A PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ADMINISTERING
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Applying the theories of Weber and Coase, this Part conceives of
Google as a private administrative agency administering the right to be
forgotten. As a private administrative agency, Google is exercising
quasi-lawmaking, quasi-adjudicative, and quasi-enforcement powers
in how it administers the right to be forgotten in the EU. Although
this delegation of power raises serious concerns for democratic
281 Welcome to the Global Community!, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/get-started
(last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
282 Public Comment Opportunities, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/public-comments
(last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
283 See New Generic Top-Level Domains, ICANN GNSO, http://gnso.icann.org/en/
council/policy/new-gtlds (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
284 See Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN, https://www.
icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
285 See id. (allowing trademark owners “in cases of abusive registration [to] submit
a complaint to an approved dispute-resolution service provider”).
286 Other entities that deal with Internet-related services include: Internet
Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), Internet Society, and Internet.org. See About,
INTERNET.ORG, http://internet.org/about (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); About the IETF,
IETF, https://www.ietf.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); Who We Are, INTERNET
SOC’Y, http://www.internetsociety.org/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). In the
copyright context, Internet service providers (“ISPs”) also act as private administrative
agencies in processing notice-and-takedown requests. See infra Part V.B.2 and
accompanying text.
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accountability and due process, the following Part V will later defend
the delegation of power subject to greater transparency and oversight.
A. Structure of Google
Under Weber’s theory of bureaucracies and Coase’s theory of the
firm, viewing Google as an administrative agency no longer seems
odd. Like an agency, Google is a vertically integrated organization — a
bureaucracy.287 Google has a market capitalization of $365.46 billion
and a staff of 46,170 employees in over 70 offices in over 40 countries
around the world.288 At least in some areas, such as Washington, D.C.,
Google even draws some of its executives and employees from
government agencies, such as the Department of Defense — further
blurring the lines between public and private agency.289
Likewise, the EU government bodies are bureaucracies that face
questions similar to the ones faced by firms on whether to internalize
certain operating costs within their own bureaucracy or to outsource
them to other entities.290 Indeed, one useful way to think of the
relationship between Google and the Data Protection Authorities and
the EU government actors is in terms of transaction costs. The
national data protection agencies could have processed RTBF claims in
the first instance, but probably not without an increase in transaction
costs in setting up or updating their online systems specifically for
RTBF claims and in hiring more staff to process RTBF claims in each
country. Each of the 28 national DPAs would have to incur some
287 Cf. Ken Favaro, Vertical Integration 2.0: An Old Strategy Makes a Comeback,
STRATEGY+BUSINESS (May 6, 2015), http://www.strategy-business.com/blog/VerticalIntegration-2-0-An-Old-Strategy-Makes-a-Comeback (discussing popularity of vertical
integration among tech companies in Silicon Valley).
288 Google Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/facts/locations/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2015); Claire Cain Miller, Google Releases Employee Data, Illustrating
Tech’s Diversity Challenge, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (May 28, 2014, 6:42 P.M.),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/google-releases-employee-data-illustrating-techsdiversity-challenge/; Brad Reed, Apple Is Now Worth More than Microsoft and Google
Combined, BGR (Feb. 11, 2015, 4:55 PM), http://bgr.com/2015/02/11/apple-vs-googlemicrosoft-market-cap/.
289 See Yasha Levine, The Revolving Door Between Google and the Department of
Defense, PANDO (Apr. 23, 2014), http://pando.com/2014/04/23/the-revolving-doorbetween-google-and-the-department-of-defense/.
290 See, e.g., European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy
Department D: Budgetary Affairs, The Impact on the EU and National Budgets of EU
Agencies — Case Studies, at 15-17 (2012), available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/453235/IPOL-JOIN_ET(2012)453235_
EN.pdf (analyzing costs of regulation by two EU agencies compared to national
agencies).
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duplicative start-up costs to set up or update an online system for
RTBF claims. And, at least in countries with high volumes of claims,
more staff would likely be needed. Within the first nine months of
Google’s implementation of its online system, it processed the
following number of RTBF requests for the top five countries in terms
of requests: (1) 45,628 from France, (2) 37,836 from Germany, (3)
28,572 from Great Britain, (4) 20,770 from Spain, and (5) 17,029 from
Italy.291 Many of the other countries had far fewer requests (a few
thousand or less), but even then the number of requests represents an
increase in workload for the respective DPA.292
The EU’s decision not to internalize the initial processing of RTBF
claims within the national Data Protection Authorities in each of the
28 EU members was arguably more efficient. Viewed under Coase’s
theory, the DPAs and the EU incurred little transaction costs in
allowing Google to become the initial decision-maker. From the EU’s
perspective, it was far more efficient for Google to set up one central
claims system for all 28 EU countries than for each one of them to set
up its own system (or the EU to set up an entirely new EU-wide
system that would have to coordinate with each national DPA).293
Almost within two weeks, Google set up an online claims system in
the EU for RTBF claims.294 Moreover, from a jurisprudential view, the
arrangement has its own advantages. With 28 different national DPAs,
the likelihood that different offices would have taken different views
of the RTBF seems at least moderate, if not great. It would not have
been surprising if some offices (such as the United Kingdom versus
France) decided similar requests in a conflicting manner.295 Given the
differences in size and staff of the various DPAs, one also would
expect varying levels of quality in the review process among the
DPAs.296 With Google, at least all of the requests are receiving
291 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20 (reflecting data taken Feb. 28, 2015).
292 See id.
293 See Edward Lee, Judge Google: Why the EU Should Embrace Google’s Role in the Right
to Be Forgotten, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2015, 4:59 PM EDT),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-lee/judge-google-why-the-eu-s_b_7232688.html.
294 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 1.
295 For example, although it does not handle privacy complaints, a subcommittee
of the House of Lords criticized the right to be forgotten as unworkable. See Tyler
Lopez, U.K. Is Coming Around to Google’s Side on Right to Be Forgotten, SLATE (Aug. 1,
2014, 3:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/08/01/u_k_is_coming_
around_to_google_s_side_on_the_right_to_be_forgotten.html.
296 See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 42 (2010),
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relatively the same levels of review, presumably under the same
standards as interpreted by Google.
Google’s policy on the right to be forgotten should also be viewed as
a form of global governance. Google is the world’s most popular
search engine.297 Google’s policy on its search results and whether
people can request any changes affects the world. By 2015, Google
recognized a right to be forgotten only for the 28 EU members and the
four European Economic Area countries.298 As more countries
recognize a right to be forgotten, Google may be required to expand its
coverage; Russia passed a law recognizing the right effective January
2016.299 Moreover, Google may voluntarily choose to extend a form of
right to be forgotten for other countries. For example, Google has
recognized a limited right for victims of revenge porn to request
removal of links to nude photographs of them that are posted online
without their consent.300 This policy applies globally to Google.com.
Whatever policy Google chooses, it affects — and governs — people
around the world and their online identities.
B. Functions of Google
Google’s role as a private administrative agency is manifest in the
variety of public functions it is serving in enforcing the right to be
forgotten. It is not surprising that Google describes its own role in
classic administrative agency terms: “We had to create an
administrative system to intake the requests and then act on them.”301

available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Data-protection_en.pdf.
297 Konrad Krawczyk, Google Is Easily the Most Popular Search Engine, but Have You
Heard Who’s in Second?, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 3, 2014), http://www.digitaltrends.com/
web/google-baidu-are-the-worlds-most-popular-search-engines/ (stating Google commands
68.75% of global search).
298 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 2;
Brian S. Hall, What Europe’s New ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Online Means, PC WORLD (June
5, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2359982/what-the-eus-new-rightto-be-forgotten-online-means.html.
299 See Tetyana Lokot, President Putin Signs Russian ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ into Law,
GLOBAL VOICES (July 18, 2015, 5:59 GMT), https://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/07/18/
president-putin-signs-russian-right-to-be-forgotten-into-law/.
300 See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Google’s Action on Revenge Porn Opens
the Door on Right to Be Forgotten in US, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2015, 4:58 PM EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/25/googles-revenge-porn-opensright-forgotten-us.
301 Toobin, supra note 108 (quoting Google lawyer David Price) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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To put it pithily: Google looks like an agency, talks like an agency,
and acts like an agency.
1.

Adjudication and Rendering of Decisions

Google’s most prominent role in the enforcement of the right to be
forgotten is adjudication. Google is the decision-maker. Google is the
first and perhaps often the last stage of adjudication to decide which
requests for removal of a listing on Google’s search engine are
meritorious. As discussed earlier, the process Google affords is quite
streamlined and, although challenges may be brought to the national
Data Protection Authority and courts, relatively few requests for
removal appear to have proceeded beyond Google’s determination.302
Although critics have openly attacked the delegation of decisionmaking authority to Google,303 such criticisms only confirm that
Google’s decision-making role is perceived as one involving the kind
of power associated with government bodies. As Austrian Justice
Minister Wolfgang Brandstetter remarked, “We can’t leave it up to
search engines to decide on the right balance between freedom of
expression and right to be forgotten.”304 Following the decision, a
group of EU justice ministers expressed the “need to build a public
jurisdiction that can address this issue.”305
2.

Investigation, Information Gathering, and Enforcement

Google also serves the important agency roles of informationgathering and enforcement. Google has collected information related
to 356,012 requests to remove 1,261,476 RTBF links in a year and a
half.306 While Google admits that its ability to investigate the facts
asserted in RTBF claims of individuals is quite limited,307 Google does
require documentation of the identity of the person asserting the

302

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
304 Stephanie Bodoni, EU Seeks to Curb Google Control of Right to Be Forgotten,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Oct. 10, 2014, 4:00 PM PDT) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-10/eu-seeks-to-curb-google-control-ofright-to-be-forgotten.
305 Id. (quoting Italian Justice Minister Andrea Orlando) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
306 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20 (results on Dec. 10, 2015).
307 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 12.
303
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request for removal.308 Moreover, through its Transparency Reports,
Google shares information related to the RTBF requests it has
processed, including data related to the total number of requests,
grants, and rejections of the requests in total and also by country.309
Google exercises great enforcement power by holding the ultimate
power to remove the challenged links or not.
3.

Lawmaking: Rules, Interpretations, and Guidance

Google has exercised a quasi-lawmaking power. Google has
interpreted the Costeja decision and the EU Data Protection Directive.
Google’s interpretation is embodied in several places. First, Google’s
website has a RTBF claim form that explains Google’s understanding
of the right and the decision.310 Second, Google has explained its
understanding in greater depth in its reply to the questionnaire from
the Article 29 Working Party,311 as well as in public statements
including an article by Chief Legal Officer David Drummond
published in The Guardian.312
Third, Google has set up an Advisory Council that hosted seven
public meetings and that “invited contributions from government,
business, media, academia, the technology sector, data protection
organizations and other organizations with a particular interest in the
area, to identify and discuss the challenging issues at the intersection
308 See Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17
(“To prevent fraudulent removal requests from people impersonating others, trying to
harm competitors, or improperly seeking to suppress legal information, we need to
verify identity. Please attach a legible copy of a document that verifies your identity
(or the identity of the person whom you are authorized to represent).”).
309 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20.
310 Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17 (“A
recent ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (C-131/12, 13 May 2014)
found that certain people can ask search engines to remove specific results for queries
that include their name, where the interests in those results appearing are outweighed
by the person’s privacy rights.
....
When you make such a request, we will balance the privacy rights of the individual
with the public’s interest to know and the right to distribute information. When
evaluating your request, we will look at whether the results include outdated
information about you, as well as whether there’s a public interest in the information
— for example, we may decline to remove certain information about financial scams,
professional malpractice, criminal convictions, or public conduct of government
officials.”).
311 See generally Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22.
312 See Drummond, supra note 125.
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of the right to information and the right to privacy.”313 Google
received thousands of comments online.314 Although not quite to the
level of a notice-and-comment rulemaking, the process included
aspects of public participation in the formulation of the Council’s
interpretation. And the end result was a 41-page document that
reflects the Council’s view of the RTBF, the nature of the right, the
criteria that should be used to assess RTBF claims, and the procedure
and scope of enforcement.315 The extraordinary document reads much
like a public agency’s rulemaking or recommendations.316 Of course,
the Advisory Council’s view does not have the force of law, and on the
key issue of the scope of enforcement (Google.com-wide or Europeanspecific Google services), the Advisory Council’s view conflicts with
the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines.317 But, in terms of
functioning and practical effect, Google’s and its Advisory Council’s
views on the RTBF are undoubtedly influential.
4.

Developing Expertise Related to RTBF

While many in the EU have criticized Google for its handling of
RTBF requests, Google has developed a certain amount of expertise in
deciding RTBF simply by virtue of the fact that it has the most
experience among search engines in deciding such requests — over
356,000 requests related to 1,261,476 URLs in a little over a year and a
half.318 Google’s expertise will only grow as it continues to process
hundreds of thousands of requests each year.
In sum, Google is operating as a private administrative agency in its
handling of RTBF claims. The EU’s tacit or informal delegation of
decision-making authority to Google can be explained as an attempt to
outsource administrative tasks to a private agency. In its processing of
313

Google Advisory Council, supra note 16.
Id. (“That’s why we convened a council of experts to review input from dozens
of experts in meetings across Europe, as well as from thousands of submissions via the
Web.”).
315 See FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 143.
316 Compare id. (the Advisory Council’s report), with Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.13 (2014) (regulating children’s privacy online), and
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
(calling for privacy and data security legislation).
317 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
318 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20 (results on Dec. 10, 2015).
314
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RTBF requests, Google performs the kind of important public
functions that are associated with public regulatory agencies. And
given the reach of its policy and decisions, Google is engaged in a form
of global governance over Internet users. It is a global administrative
agency, with regulatory powers affecting people around the world.
V.

THE TRADEOFFS OF GOOGLE’S ROLE IN THE RTBF

This Part examines the tradeoffs in delegating Google considerable
discretion to handle RTBF claims in the EU. While the drawbacks are
significant and raise serious concerns, the benefits of this arrangement
are also substantial and may justify outsourcing the processing of
these claims to Google — subject to some modifications as discussed
later in Part VI.
A. Drawbacks
Giving Google the primary responsibility of deciding the contours of
the newly recognized right to be forgotten — the standard for which is
still developing — is an invitation for problems. As this section
explains, there are numerous drawbacks in delegating to Google this
important responsibility in protecting a fundamental right in the EU.
1.

Google Staff Are Not Public Officials

For starters, Google is a profit-making corporation whose overall
objective is to increase the wealth of its shareholders. While it also has
other more public-minded goals (e.g., innovate, “don’t be evil,” spread
knowledge, and philanthropy through its nonprofit arms),319 Google is
a business whose overall goal is to make money — which it has done
quite well.320 Relatedly, Google’s employees are not public officials.
Google’s employees cannot be held accountable by the public in same
way as public officials (e.g., civil servants, judges, or legislators)
can.321 Indeed, the public might not even be able to determine the
319 See, e.g., Brian Fung, Google’s Search for a Better Motto, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/11/03/larry-page-googlesoutgrown-dont-be-evil-and-its-other-mottos/; Google Global Impact Awards, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.org/global-giving/global-impact-awards/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
320 See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Google Revenues Up 11% as Earnings Surpass
Forecast, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/
technology/google-earnings-second-quarter.html.
321 Elected officials can be held accountable by voters at the ballot box, while civil
servants can be held by a variety of institutional mechanisms, including transparency
requirements, department inspector generals, auditing, and public oversight. See, e.g.,
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identities of most of Google’s employees, including the ones who
process RTBF claims. Google does not publish a list of its employees
who are handling RTBF claims, much less their background and
expertise. They are all anonymous.
Another concern is the lack of diversity among Google employees —
a concern that could exist with other entities and government.322
Google has greater gender diversity in its nontechnical positions
compared to technical positions, even non-engineering positions have
only 3% African Americans and 4% Hispanics in the United States.323
Google has not released data on the ethnicity composition of its
employees outside the United States. Although most of the RTBF staff
are reportedly located in Dublin, it is not clear if Google employees
outside of Europe are also involved.324
2.

Google’s Possible Bias in Favor of Access to Information

The use of Google employees to process RTBF claims filed with
Google raises questions about the training and competence of the
employees assigned to process the claims. As mentioned above,
Google has not released information related to the background of
those employees assigned to process the RTBF claims. While it is
possible some of Google’s employees have extensive knowledge of EU
privacy law, one might conjecture that the employees at the national
Data Protection Authorities have greater knowledge of EU privacy law,
on average, given the DPA’s primary mission to implement and protect
the EU data privacy rights.325 Relatedly, Google employees may have
an institutional bias that is more skeptical of the RTBF claims. Google
has publicly stated that it disagrees with the Costeja decision, even
while acknowledging that it will implement the decision.326 Back in
2011, writing on his personal blog and not in his capacity as Google’s
ALLAN ROSENBAUM, GOOD GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PUBLIC SERVANT 3-4,
available
at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/
unpan005698.pdf.
322 See Drake Baer, Google Has an Embarrassing Diversity Problem, BUS. INSIDER
(May 29, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-diversity-problem-2014-5.
323 Id.
324 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
325 See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 296, at 21-27.
326 See Drummond, supra note 125 (“It’s for these reasons that we disagree with the
ruling. That said, we obviously respect the court’s authority and are doing our very best to
comply quickly and responsibly.”); James Vincent, Google Chief Eric Schmidt Says ‘Right to
Be Forgotten’ Ruling Has Got the Balance ‘Wrong,’ INDEPENDENT (May 15, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/google-chief-eric-schmidt-saysright-to-be-forgotten-ruling-has-got-the-balance-wrong-9377231.html.
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General Privacy Counsel, Peter Fleischer expressed concern that
privacy claims could be used as a form of censorship.327 More
generally, Google has a longstanding belief in the sharing of
knowledge and access to information, so the RTBF may run counter to
its ideals.328 As its own website hails, “Google’s mission is to organize
the world’s information and make it universally accessible and
useful.”329 Numerous critics in the EU have already called into
question Google’s commitment to protecting the RTBF.330
However, after reviewing over 200,000 requests in nine months of
its implementation of the RTBF, Google struck a more conciliatory
note and appeared to be more open to the possibility there may be a
legitimate need to protect people’s RTBF.331 Peter Barron, Google’s
European communications director, conceded: “We certainly accept
that there is an issue to be addressed. For us, the whole process has
been an exercise in learning and listening and, as [Google co-founder
and CEO] Larry Page has said, to try to see things from a more
European perspective.”332 In 2015, Google search chief Amit Singhal
even stated that teenagers in the United States should have a right to
be forgotten for some of their youthful indiscretions.333 Nonetheless,
Google comes to the issue with a stated preference for universal
accessibility of content online.
3.

Minimal Due Process Afforded by Google

Another potential problem is the minimal due process afforded by
Google to a claimant. However, it should be noted that the process
afforded by national Data Protection Authorities is also typically
modest, so concern in this area might be reason to reform the entire
process of administration.334
327 Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, BLOGSPOT (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html.
328 See About Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2015).
329 Id.
330 See, e.g., Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our Right to
Be Forgotten, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:30 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/feb/18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-search.
331 See Powles, supra note 88.
332 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
333 See Shara Tibken, Google Search Chief: Users Have Right to Be Forgotten Online — in
Some Cases, CNET (Oct. 8, 2015, 10:42 AM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/
news/users-have-the-right-to-be-forgotten-online-in-some-cases-google-search-chief-says/.
334 See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text. See generally Internet Search
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Streamlined Ex Parte Process with No Hearing

Google does not afford a hearing or oral argument to individual
claimants. The individual requests for delisting and Google’s decisions
are handled by exchange of written notices electronically.335 If Google
has questions about the submission, it may request more information,
again through electronic transmission.336 The process is conducted ex
parte, with only the claimant or claimant’s representative able to make
requests to Google.337 Third parties and members of the public who
may have an interest in the information are not able to make
submissions to Google.338 Of course, the nature of the right to be
forgotten is a personal privacy right, so disclosure to third parties may
frustrate the exercise of that right. Google does inform the webmaster
whose page has been delisted after Google has made its decision, but
without reference to the claimant.339 In such cases, the webmaster or
publisher of the delisted content may ask Google for
reconsideration.340 One benefit of the streamlined process is that
Google is able to respond very quickly (within 1 to 6 days) to a
person’s request.341

Results, INFORM. COMMISSIONER’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/concerns/search-results/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2015) (detailing takedown process of United Kingdom’s data
protection authority).
335 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 7.
336 Id. at 5, 8.
337 See Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17; see
also Eric Goldman, Primer on European Union’s Right to Be Forgotten (Excerpt from My
Internet Law Casebook) + Bonus Linkwrap, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/08/primer-on-european-unions-right-to-beforgotten-excerpt-from-my-internet-law-casebook-bonus-linkwrap.htm (“[G]oogle will
make its decisions on an ex parte basis, based solely on representations by requesting
individuals.”).
338 See Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17
(requiring that only “the person affected by the web pages identified,” or a legally
authorized representatives of an affected person, may make submissions to Google). See
generally Loek Essers, This Is How Google Handles ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 19, 2014, 12:54 PM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2849686/this-is-how-google-handles-right-to-be-forgotten-requests.html (describing
the system Google has implemented to accommodate the “right to be forgotten”).
339 Essers, supra note 338.
340 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 6.
341 See, e.g., E-mail from Subject 1 to Author (Feb. 17, 2015, 1:39 PM CT) (on file
with author) (notifying decision within approximately twenty-four hours); E-mail
from Subject 2 to Author (Apr. 12, 2015, 5:00 GMT) (on file with author) (notifying
decision within six days).
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Decision Notice Has Modest Explanation

Google notifies each claimant of Google’s decision by email.342 The
decision includes the reason for the decision.343 If the request is
accepted, Google simply notifies the person that “[a]ccording to your
request Google Inc. takes appropriate measures to block the following
URLs in the European versions of the Google search results for search
queries related to your name . . . .”344 For rejections, Google provides a
little more explanation. Based on my interviews with two individuals
who received rejections, Google provided them with a one-paragraph
explanation of the general reason for the rejection; the reason given
appeared to be cut and paste from a standard response composed by
Google for that type of rejection (matters relating to professional
work).345
c.

No Formal Rehearing or Appeal by Claimant Within Google

From public accounts of its procedure, Google does not appear to
offer a claimant whose claim has been rejected a formal opportunity
for a rehearing or appeal within Google. Once Google has made its
decision and notified the claimant, the process within Google is done
for the claimant.346 Based on my interview of a person who received a
rejection, Google responded to an email sent by the claimant about
Google’s decision, but Google just repeated its original decision in
response.347 As the rejection notice of Google indicates, if the claimant
wants to appeal Google’s decision, the claimant must pursue the
dispute with the national data protection authority or with the
webmaster of the website containing the information.348 By contrast,
342

See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 2.
See E-mail from Subject 1 to Author, supra note 341.
344 See E-mail from Subject 2 to Author, supra note 341.
345 See, e.g., E-mail from Subject 1 to Author, supra note 341 (“The URL in this
case seems to refer to matters related to their professional work in conjunction and are
of significant public interest. The URL could be, for example, for your current and
potential customers or users of your service(s) is important. This also applies to
information about you recently executed trades or businesses in which you were
working. Consequently, access to the relevant content in the search is guaranteed to
provide your name, as it is of general public interest.”) (Google translation from
Polish).
346 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5
(stating Google informs the applicant of the right to appeal the decision to the data
protection authority).
347 See E-mail from Subject 1 to Author (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:26 PM CT) (on file with
author).
348 Id.; see Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5.
343
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Google does reconsider a removal of a link if the webmaster or
publisher of the content whose link has been removed requests it.349 In
some cases, Google has reinstated the link based on a second review of
the RTBF claim.350
4.

Errors of Law

Given the combination of factors mentioned above, plus the
minimal guidance provided by the Costeja decision, Google seems
bound to make some mistakes. Even a public agency or court would.
Part of the reason is that the law regarding the right to be forgotten is
still developing. Even though the Working Party later came out with
guidelines of its own and the EU may adopt new standards in the
proposed General Data Protection Regulation, these developments
only underscore how unsettled the precise contours of the RTBF is.351
Moreover, because the RTBF must be decided on a case-by-case basis
with a balancing of private and public interests, the determination of
RTBF claims may spark differences in viewpoints on what the correct
balance is in a particular case. Besides the inherent difficulties of
applying a balancing test on a case-by-case basis with consistency,
Google’s particular situation and process may create a greater
likelihood of error. As discussed above, Google itself has no prior
expertise in this area of EU privacy law, a possible institutional bias in
favor of access to information, and a highly streamlined process to
handle RTBF claims.352 Even while acting in good faith, Google might
decide close cases in favor of access to information given its corporate
mission, in a way that national Data Protection Authorities and courts
might disagree with. Further errors might result from Google’s
streamlined process with not enough information or opportunity for
an individual to prosecute or appeal her claim with Google.
B. Benefits
Although the disadvantages of Google’s processing of RTBF claims
appear to be substantial, the benefits may also be significant and

349

See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 6.
Id.
351 See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 14, art. 17, at 51 (listing
factors to consider in RTBF claims); Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines,
supra note 124, at 5-6 (discussing the balancing test between personal privacy and the
public’s need to know in RTBF claims).
352 See supra notes 327–50 and accompanying text.
350
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provide some justification for the EU’s delegation of power to Google
to serve as a decision-maker.
1.

Bigger Budget and More Staff

First, Google has at its disposal considerable resources. As
mentioned above, Google has a market capitalization of $365.46
billion and a staff of 46,170 employees worldwide.353 Its profits for the
last quarter of 2014 were $4.76 billion, up nearly 30% from the same
period in 2013.354 By contrast, Data Protection Authorities in EU
countries have comparatively modest budgets. For example, the UK
DPA had a budget of nearly £20 million, while Ireland had
approximately £1.2 million in 2014.355 According to a 2010 report, a
number of EU countries (e.g., Austria, Italy, Romania, France, and
Portugal) did not have adequate funding for their DPAs.356 The report
concluded: “[T]he absence of sufficient human and financial resources
represents a significant challenge to the effectiveness of the national
supervisory systems that might jeopardize the protection of the
fundamental rights of data subjects.”357
Given the clear advantage in financial resources and staff that
Google enjoys, delegating the lion’s share of administration of RTBF
claims to Google makes considerable sense. With such resources,
Google set up the infrastructure, staffing, and webform within weeks
of the Costeja decision. After an initial backlog of RTBF requests,
Google appears to be processing the requests with efficiency. By
December 10, 2015, Google had evaluated 356,012 requests and
1,261,476 URLs for removal, and granted removals with respect to
42.1% of the URLs.358 Google processed, on average, over 19,770
claims per month — which translates into approximately 650
decisions a day. Two individuals whom I interviewed received their
responses from Google within 1 and 6 days, respectively.359

353

See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
Google Profits Up but Revenue Misses Expectations, BBC (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31047843.
355 Irish Data Chiefs Get Budget Boost, DECISIONMARKETING (Oct. 14, 2014, 11:39
AM), http://www.decisionmarketing.co.uk/news/irish-data-chiefs-get-budget-boost.
356 See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 296, at 20.
357 Id.
358 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20 (reflecting data as presented on December 10, 2015).
359 E-mail from Subject 1 to Author, supra note 341; E-mail from Subject 2 to
Author, supra note 341.
354
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Experience in Notice-and-Takedown to Handle Expeditiously
Large Number of Requests

Google already has decades of experience handling a high volume of
copyright notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) and comparable ISP safe harbors in other countries. Under
the DMCA safe harbor, a copyright owner can send a so-called DMCA
notice to an ISP to request the removal of allegedly infringing material
either linked to or hosted by the ISP.360 The volume of copyright
notices Google receives for its sites (including Google and YouTube)
is much higher than the number of RTBF claims. For example, Google
received copyright notices to remove 8,107,272 URLs in just one week
(of February 9, 2015) — meaning more than a million URLs in one
day on average.361 By one estimate, “Google is currently asked to
remove an infringing search result every 8 milliseconds, compared to
one request per six days back in 2008.”362 The ISP’s review of such
copyright notices is even more modest: ISPs must expeditiously take
down the allegedly infringing material in order to fall within the safe
harbor.363 Presumably, Google is using an automated system to handle
such a high volume of copyright notices and then relying upon the
party whose link has been removed to file a counter-notice with
Google to challenge the copyright notice. Google has also instituted a
Content ID system for copyright owners to digitally tag their content
on YouTube, so it can detect unauthorized copies of their content.364
Although both copyright owners and users of content have criticized
the notice-and-takedown process, it has become a major feature of the
online ecosystem for ISPs and copyright owners. For our purposes, it
shows Google’s ability to process a high volume of requests in an
efficient manner. In its fact sheet on the right to be forgotten, the EU
Commission cited Google’s handling of copyright notices as evidence

360

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (2012).
Requests to Remove Content Due to Copyright, GOOGLE, www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/copyright/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
362 Ernesto, Google Asked to Remove 1 Million Pirate Links Per Day, TORRENTFREAK
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/google-asked-to-remove-1-million-piratelinks-per-day-140820/.
363 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (2012).
364 How Content ID Works, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2797370?hl=en (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). See generally Benjamin Boroughf, The
Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair
Compensation, 25 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 95, 104-07 (2015) (describing Content ID
system).
361
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that Google can handle a high volume of RTBF claims.365 Of course,
RTBF claims are different from copyright notices in that RTBF claims
require human review of the claims, as well as more analysis of the law
and the facts asserted than the typical copyright notice. However,
Google’s demonstrated ability to adapt to large volumes of compliance
issues in the copyright arena provides at least some basis to predict that
Google can handle the administrative burden of processing RTBF claims.
3.

Better at Analytics

Google also is good at analytics. Google’s search itself is a
technology based on analytics — its algorithm identifies relevant
search results based on identifying websites with more links from
other websites.366 Google offers analytics tools for websites to study
and improve traffic to their sites, as well as to target their ads.367 In
addition, Google issues transparency reports summarizing data related
to a variety of topics, including government censorship requests,
copyright notices, RTBF requests, user requests for information,
Google product traffic, encryption of email, and detected malware.368
At least for the RTBF claims, the information is updated in real time as
Google decides the claims. Although national Data Protection
Authorities might have some experts in analytics and statistics as well,
it is hard to imagine that the number of experts plus technical knowhow could rival Google’s. As Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg
describe in their book How Google Works, Google’s success derives
largely from its ability to find a strong technical insight to a
problem.369 Perhaps Google can utilize some form of analytics to the
RTBF issue, for example, by identifying recurring traits of the
successful versus unsuccessful RTBF claims and publishing guidelines
for people in the EU.

365 Factsheet on the “Right to Be Forgotten” Ruling (C 131/12), EUROPEAN COMM’N 5,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
366 See ERIC SCHMIDT & JONATHAN ROSENBERG, HOW GOOGLE WORKS 69 (2014).
367 See Google Analytics, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/analytics/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2015).
368 See
Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
369 SCHMIDT & ROSENBERG, supra note 366, at 70.
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More Efficient than Government Agency

Google may have an advantage in being a Fortune 500 company that
is often considered to be one of the most innovative in the world.370
Google’s success in the business and tech world provides some evidence
that Google can handle demanding tasks with sufficient resources,
efficiency, and organization.371 By contrast, some Data Protection
Authorities are notorious for lack of funding, resources, and power.372
According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, “In many Member
States, DPAs are not in a position to carry out the entirety of their tasks
because of the limited economic and human resources available to
them.”373 Or, as some critics in the EU have put it, “Most of Europe’s 31
national data protection authorities are cumbersome, under-resourced
bureaucracies issuing occasional, random fines and reacting when a
court occasionally clarifies the law.”374
5.

Experimentation and Making Legal Mistakes

Another virtue of having a private administrative agency in charge of
processing RTBF claims is the flexibility that a nongovernmental actor
may enjoy in experimentation and even in making mistakes. Even EU
policymakers and national governments in the EU are still figuring out
the precise contours of the RTBF.375 If the national DPAs in 28 EU
countries were responsible for deciding all RTBF claims, conflicting
decisions could result in at least some of the 28 countries.376 The
370 See, e.g., The Most Innovative Companies: An Interactive Guide, BCG PERSPECTIVES
(Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/interactive/innovation_
growth_most_innovative_companies_interactive_guide/ (Google ranked No. 2); The
World’s 50 Most Innovative Companies, FAST COMPANY, http://www.fastcompany.com/
section/most-innovative-companies-2015 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (Google ranked
No. 4).
371 See supra note 370; see also Steve Lohr, The Google Formula for Success, N.Y.
TIMES: BITS (Sept. 28, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/thegoogle-formula-for-success/?_r=0.
372 See supra notes 355–57 and accompanying text.
373 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 296, at 42
(“This is the case in Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia,
Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia.”).
374 Powles & Chaparro, supra note 330.
375 See, e.g., Press Release, Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, June 18, 2015,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/pressrelease/art29_press_material/2015/20150618_wp29_press_release_on_delisting.pdf
(conceding several issues still need refining, including “role in public life” criteria, a
well-founded complaint, and the standard for outdatedness).
376 The proposed General Data Protection Regulation was intended to create a

2016]

Recognizing Rights in Real Time

1083

public’s confidence in the RTBF could be undermined if the 28 DPAs
openly disagree on basic aspects of the RTBF. But having Google go first
avoids that problem. Google becomes, in effect, the guinea pig to figure
out and develop the RTBF. And, if Google gets it wrong, the public’s
confidence in the right will not be shaken if EU authorities correct the
errors and provide, over time, a better understanding of the right.
VI. TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF THE HYBRID ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
This final Part proposes a new model of a hybrid administrative
agency. The hybrid agency would not displace any current private or
public administrative agencies. Instead, it would serve as a bridge
between the two. This arrangement would make the private
administrative agency more democratically accountable while not
sacrificing the efficiencies and other advantages that such private
entities offer.
A. Theory: Public-Private Partnerships in the Administrative State
The proposed hybrid agency draws upon the rich literature
discussing theories related to public-private partnerships (“PPP”).377
PPP is a term used loosely to describe joint relationships between
government and private actors to deliver services to the public related
to health, security, or typically other social goods.378 The PPP
approach is meant to be collaborative and to break down the
traditional limited view of the separate roles of “public” and “private”
actors.379 As Professor Freeman explains, “A collaborative regime
challenges existing assumptions about what constitutes public or
private roles in governance because the most collaborative
arrangements will often involve sharing responsibilities and mutual
accountability that crosses the public-private divide.”380 In short, “the
uniform approach for the entire EU, instead of the current Data Protection Directive,
which is implemented by different national laws among EU members. See Francoise
Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New Compliance Requirements in Sight — What
the Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation Means for U.S. Companies, 28 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 817 (2012).
377 See, e.g., Kathy Sharp et al., Public-Private Partnerships: Evolutions in the U.S.
Public Procurement System and Lessons Learned from the UK and the EU, 2 INT’L GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 15, at 1 (Mar. 2005), available at https://www.crowell.com/documents/
DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_827.pdf.
378 See, e.g., Note, Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance Regulation, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1367, 1367-68 (2008) (arguing for PPPs in provision of social goods).
379 See id.
380 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
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overarching goal of all PPPs is to capitalize on the private sector’s
management skills, expertise, innovations, efficiencies, and alternative
methods of funding.”381
Collaborative PPP theory thus aims at a new model of interaction
between public and private actors. The delineation between public and
private actor disappears in favor of collaboration among various
stakeholders or contributors from different sectors, all of whom can
contribute to and benefit from the cooperative process.382 Getting each
contributor invested in the process — as an equal participant with
equal responsibility — may help to improve the working relationships
among the group and to overcome hardened, adversarial positions
between the regulators and the regulated. For example, at a speech in
Silicon Valley among leading tech companies, President Obama
offered a proposal to combat cyberattacks and to increase
cybersecurity by creating data hubs in which government and private
entities share information about cyberthreats.383 While some tech
companies were still wary of the government’s overture following the
revelations of the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) secret
surveillance program and its threat to privacy,384 the President’s
proposal at least represented a much more cooperative relationship
than the covert NSA program.
PPP theory prizes experimentalism and flexibility. Put simply,
“errors are not viewed as failures.”385 Many tasks that agencies face are
difficult and complex. Yet failures and setbacks of the government
often become fodder for media ridicule as well as the subject of
partisan politics. The fiasco over the Obama Administration’s
HealthCare.gov website, which could not adequately handle
enrollments to the Obamacare plan on the date of its rollout, is a case

REV. 1, 30 (1997) [hereinafter Collaborative Governance].
381 David W. Gaffey, Note, Outsourcing Infrastructure: Expanding the Use of PublicPrivate Partnerships in the United States, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 353 (2010).
382 See Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 380, at 30-33.
383 Reena Flores, Can Obama, GOP Reach Consensus on Cybersecurity?, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 21, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-obama-gop-reachconsensus-on-cybersecurity/; Reena Flores & Arden Farhi, Obama Recruits Tech Giants
for New Cybersecurity Efforts, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2015, 8:15 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-recruits-tech-giants-apple-intel-reveals-newcybersecurity-information-sharing-proposals/.
384 See Troy Wolverton, Silicon Valley: Obama Calls on Corporations to Work with
Government to Prevent Cyberattacks, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2015, 8:22 AM
PST), http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_27520838/obama-issues-cybersecurityorder-at-open-summit.
385 Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 380, at 31.
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in point. The website was constructed by 33 companies, but the
government failed to designate clearly a coordinator and overseer to
ensure all of the work of the various companies would be
integrated.386 To resolve the problem, the Obama administration
brought in engineers from leading U.S. tech companies Google,
Oracle, and Redhat in a so-called tech surge.387 The integration of the
tech experts from private industry into the oversight role was a more
advanced form of PPP relationship than the original government
contractor model that started the creation of the website. In five
months, many of the problems with the website were fixed.388 Even if
the problems had remained, one might speculate that the public would
have been accepting of problems related to the launch of a website of
that scale if the tech experts from Google, Oracle, and Redhat could
not resolve the problems right away. In terms of perception, it was no
longer the government and contractors working on the website. It was
representatives of Google, Oracle, and Redhat working with the
government on the website.
As suggested above, the Internet may be conducive to PPP
relationships given the way in which the Internet developed under a
laissez faire approach that is skeptical of government intrusiveness.
Also, Internet companies often wield immense power (perhaps equal
to the power exercised by governments) over individuals in terms of
their privacy, freedom of expression, and surveillance in ways that are
not always immediately recognized by people. Using a PPP in the
Internet context can be less threatening than direct government
regulation, while at the same time it can create greater transparency of
the powers that Internet companies already exercise over their users in
terms of their individual freedoms.
B. The New Model of Hybrid Administrative Agency
This section proposes a way to structure (i) new procedures for
search engines to process RTBF claims in the EU and (ii) a new model
386 See Louise Radnofsky, Poor Oversight, Work Marred Health Site’s Launch, Report
Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2015, 2:27 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/reportfinds-flawed-process-in-awarding-healthcare-gov-website-contracts-1421781115.
387 See Brett LoGiurato, Desperate Government Hires Google and Oracle Experts to
Fix the Obamacare Website, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 31, 2013, 2:57 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/obamacare-website-healthcare-gov-google-oracle-redhat-2013-10.
388 See Steve Contorno, Is Healthcare.gov Working ‘Great’ Now?, POLITIFACT (Mar.
14, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2014/mar/14/
healthcaregov-working-great-now/.
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of a hybrid administrative agency that fosters greater cooperation,
dialogue, transparency, and accountability among private and public
actors alike. The features of this proposed hybrid administrative
agency are offered as an example of how a more flexible approach
might be constructed. The proposal is not meant as the sole or
exclusive way of designing a hybrid administrative agency. Nor is it
meant as a panacea for the problems of democratic accountability
inherent in any delegation of authority to private actors. Instead, the
proposal is meant as a blueprint to consider and springboard for future
discussion.
1.

Standardized RTBF Form for Search Engines and the ThirdPair-of-Eyes Review

The first part of the proposal is for the EU to create a standardized
online webform for individuals to make one RTBF request that could,
upon the individual’s election, go automatically to Google, Bing, and
Yahoo! for review. Other search engines could be included as well,
but, in October 2014, Google had nearly 93% market share for search
in Europe, followed by Bing at 2.67% and Yahoo! at 2.34%.389
Currently, each search engine has its own webform, and individuals
must file a separate request with each company.390 With a
standardized RTBF form that applies to the three major search engines
in the EU, an individual can reduce the time and hassle of filing
separate requests with three or more different forms.391 The form
would be available through the website of the hybrid agency that will
oversee its processing and administration (discussed later below). If
the claimant selects to have the form sent to all three companies, the
completed form will be automatically sent, along with accompanying
documents, to each search engine, as depicted in Figure 2 below.

389

See Rosoff, Google in Europe, supra note 80.
E.g., Request to Block Bing Search Results in Europe, BING,
https://www.bing.com/webmaster/tools/eu-privacy-request (last visited Feb. 20, 2015);
Requests to Block Search Results in Yahoo Search: Resource for European Residents,
YAHOO! HELP, https://uk.help.yahoo.com/kb/SLN24378.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2015) (scroll down mid-page, and click “online form” hyperlink); Search Removal
Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17.
391 The uniform applications for international patent and trademark filings have
created efficiencies for intellectual property owners seeking international protection.
See Edward Lee, The Global Trade Mark, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 917, 930 (2014).
390
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Figure 2. Third-Pair-of-Eyes Review and Hybrid Agency Appeals

Moreover, having all three search engines review the same RTBF
request has the advantage of subjecting each claim to a second and
third pair of eyes, albeit independent eyes at different companies.
Empirical studies of the “second pair of eyes” (“SPER”) review of
patent applications by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office suggest
that it may have helped to improve the examination of the
applications.392 As depicted in Figure 2 above, under the proposed
“third pair of eyes” review, Google, Bing, and Yahoo! would each
decide the RTBF request independently of each other, but their
decisions would be collected by the hybrid agency for review, as
discussed next.
2.

The New RTBF Hybrid Agency as an Oversight Body

The second part of the proposal is to create a new hybrid
administrative agency to help provide both (i) greater oversight over
the search engines deciding RTBF claims and (ii) greater collaboration
392 See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
EMORY L.J. 181, 201-02 (2008) (“One possible explanation for the low grant rate in
this class is that the second pair of eyes is working, and that the grant rate reflects
better rigor during examinations, rather than application volume.”).
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among public and private actors in determining RTBF claims. One of
the limitations of the current structure is that the public officials of the
EU, such as in the Article 29 Working Party, are operating separately
from the decision-makers of Google and the other search engines as
these private actors are developing the RTBF on their own.393
Although there has been some dialogue between the two sides, this
siloed approach breeds an adversarial and hierarchical mode of
communication between public and private actors — the public
officials attempt to tell Google and other search engines what to do in
a top-down approach, while the search engines have to perform most
of the legwork. If the public and private actors disagree on the
contours of the RTBF, there is no formal process — other than
litigation — by which the two sides can resolve their differences.
a.

Seven Commissioners of the RTBF Agency

A hybrid agency can transform this hierarchical, adversarial
relationship between the EU and search engines by establishing a
forum in which the two sides can resolve their differences in a joint
partnership. The hybrid agency would consist of seven
Commissioners: three representatives designated by Google, Bing, and
Yahoo!, three public officials appointed by an EU government body
(such as the EU Commission), and one public official selected by
popular vote in the EU. Each of the three corporations would be asked
to contribute a portion of the funding of the hybrid agency, along with
a portion of public funds committed from the EU. The Commissioners
would decide how to allocate the funds for office space, staff, and
other needs.
b.

The Appellate Body: Public Oversight and Review of RTBF
Decisions by Search Engines

The hybrid agency’s main charge would be to provide oversight and
review of the RTBF decisions by Google, Bing, and Yahoo!, in order to
develop the RTBF in a consistent or acceptable manner, balancing the
competing interests related to the claims. The agency would receive all
RTBF decisions by search engines through encrypted digital files with
the names of the applicants redacted or anonymized. Google’s own
publication of twenty-three anonymized examples of RTBF decisions it
393 See generally Member of the Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/structure/members/index_en.htm
(last visited Aug. 21, 2015) (explaining the structure of the Article 29 Working Party
comprised of government officials).
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has made shows that search engines can summarize and then publish
their decisions without revealing the identity of the people who made
the requests.394 The collection of the RTBF decisions would be helpful
for two important goals.
The first goal would be to reduce conflicting decisions among the
three search engines. A conflict would be created if the ultimate
decision (reject or accept the request) is different among the search
engines. If an individual received inconsistent decisions from the three
search engines, the individual would be entitled to an automatic
appeal at her election. The person could decide to accept an
inconsistent result (with a link delisted on some search engines, but
not others). If the claimant elects to have an appeal, the agency would
act as the Appellate Body with three Commissioners hearing the
appeal (one randomly selected from the search engine Commissioners,
one from the EU government Commissioners, and the publicly elected
Commissioner).
The level of process afforded for the appeal could be tailored to the
degree of complexity of the appeal. The individual applicant would be
afforded an opportunity to submit a brief explaining his or her
request, but the applicant could also choose to rely upon its original
request submitted on the standardized form. The hybrid agency might
also designate a public advocate to present the arguments on the
public’s behalf. At its discretion, the hybrid agency could hold a
(closed) hearing giving the individual or her attorney an opportunity
for oral argument either in person or by video conference. The three
Commissioners would then decide the appeal by majority vote and
render a written opinion to the appellant. The decisions of the
Appellate Body would be anonymized so that no personal identifying
features of the appellant or the source of the web page would be
included. The anonymized decisions would be published so the public
would have a better understanding of what the RTBF entails.
c.

Data Analytics, Transparency, and Accountability

The hybrid agency would also conduct internal audits of all the
RTBF decisions made by search engines, as well as the Appellate
Body’s decisions. Using data analytics, the hybrid agency would
attempt to identify any common characteristics of all the decisions
rendered in favor of the claimant versus those decisions rejecting the
claims. From the data, the agency would attempt to compile more
394 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,
supra note 20.
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detailed guidelines on the factors that make a RTBF claim more or less
successful. The hybrid agency would issue an annual Transparency
Report providing information on the number of RTBF requests, the
decisions made by each search engine, and the decisions of the
Appellate Body. The precise scope of information to be published will
need to be left for further debate and deliberation. The call by eighty
professors for Google to release more data on its RTBF decisions
provides a good starting point for discussion.395
d.

Relationship to Existing EU Bodies

The hybrid agency would not have exclusive jurisdiction over
administrative appeals of decisions created by conflicts among the search
engines. The administrative appeals would be offered as an alternative
dispute resolution similar to how World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) panels decide UDRP complaints involving
domain name disputes.396 The WIPO panel decisions are not binding on
courts and do not extinguish the parties’ right to pursue litigation in
court. Likewise, the decisions of the Appellate Body would not be entitled
to any deference in national courts or data protection authorities, should
an individual wish to pursue a complaint in those fora.
C. Advantages of the Hybrid RTBF Agency
The proposed hybrid administrative agency offers several advantages
over the public agency and private agency models. However, the
hybrid agency is not meant to supplant either public or private
agencies. The administrative state in the twenty-first century thus
becomes a mixture of public, private, and hybrid agencies, each
performing specific roles.

395 Ellen Goodman, In Open Letter to Google, 80 Technology Scholars Press for More
Transparency on Right to Be Forgotten Compliance, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG (May 14,
2015), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/05/14/in-open-letter-to-google-80technology-scholars-press-for-more-transparency-on-right-to-be-forgotten-compliance/.
396 See List of Approved Dispute Resolution Providers, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); WIPO Guide to
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/#e1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (scroll down to
“Role of the Administrative Panel”).
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Synergies Between the Private/Public Worlds While Leaving
Existing Agencies Intact

The hybrid agency offers a way to harness the benefits of both
traditional public agencies and increasingly common private agencies.
It does so without supplanting either kind of agency. Instead, it serves
as a bridge between the two kinds of agencies in an area where the
input of both public officials and private actors is needed. In this way,
the hybrid agency does not interfere with the internal decision-making
of either public or private agencies. The efficiencies gained by private
agencies administering RTBF claims are preserved, as are the
important public functions and services of public agencies. But the
hybrid agency offers a way to create synergies between public and
private actors by bringing them together in a common institution with
a common task.
For example, the proposed hybrid agency does not interfere with
how Google or other search engines have designed their internal
process to decide RTBF claims. While any number of reforms could be
entertained — such as requiring greater due process and reason-giving
from the search engines — such reforms may well be intrusive and
counterproductive, sacrificing the efficiencies of private administrative
agencies and turning them into a more cumbersome quasi-public
agency. Likewise, the proposed hybrid agency does not displace the
EU government institutions, national Data Protection Authorities, or
the courts. These institutions continue to play important roles in the
development of the RTBF. Claimants can still appeal any decision by
search engines to national DPAs and eventually the courts. The
Appellate Body of the hybrid agency would provide an alternative
forum in which claimants can seek an initial appeal of the search
engines’ decisions if there is a conflict in the results.
2.

Oversight, Consistency, and Accountability

By providing a third-pair-of-eyes review and a right of
administrative appeal of conflicting decisions among the search
engines, this proposal offers a way to introduce greater oversight over
how RTBF claims are processed. The proposal creates a dual
mechanism that is designed to increase consistency among the search
engines in processing RTBF claims. Moreover, through the hybrid
agency’s publication of the annual Transparency Report and
anonymized decisions of the Appellate Body, the agency will increase
the level of public accountability. The changes mark a dramatic
improvement over the status quo in which there is no standard form
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to make RTBF claims, much less an institutional way to track and
resolve conflicts among search engines.
3.

Hybrid Administrative Agency May Be Less Subject to Industry
Capture

The diverse composition of the hybrid agency may make it less
subject to capture by the industry. By giving industry representatives a
seat at the table within the hybrid agency, the institutional design of
the agency reduces the need for backdoor dealings.397 How industry
representatives interact with government officials becomes more
transparent. Many of their interactions would be open to public view
at proceedings of the hybrid agency. Moreover, having a multimember
commission is often considered to be less susceptible to capture than a
single agency head for the simple reason that it is easier to capture one
person as opposed to several people.398
The three representatives of the EU government are less likely to
cater to the search engine industry view. At least thus far, various
representatives of the EU and other governments have been quite
critical of how Google has implemented the RTBF.399 Perhaps the
relationship has been too antagonistic, but it hardly suggests that
government officials would cater to Google’s limited view of the RTBF.
Moreover, the EU government would have the responsibility of
deciding how the three government representatives would be selected,
so the government could make it a priority to select representatives
who would not cave in to the industry view, but would represent the
public’s interest.400 The EU government could also place temporary
employment restrictions on the government representatives who
served on the hybrid agency, in order to avoid the “revolving door”
problem of government officials moving over to lucrative positions in
the same industry they regulated.401
397 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42-64 (2010) (examining “equalizing factors”
that can be included in institutional design of agencies to help avoid capture).
398 Id. at 37-38.
399 See, e.g., supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (citing government officials’
displeasure).
400 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Remarks, Explaining and Curbing Capture, in
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 23 (2013) (“You could think about who you want to have
work at the agencies in the first place to try to break up that agency culture of capture
just a little bit.”).
401 Cf. id. at 18-19, 23 (discussing potential issues for revolving door situations in
the banking industry).
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The same “revolving door” employment restriction could apply to
the public representative, who might be more sympathetic than the
government officials to the views of the search engines. But the public
representative is elected and democratically accountable to the people,
so if the public representative believed that supporting the industry
view was in the best interest of the public, that would not be a form of
capture. It would be the public representative doing her job. If the
public disagrees with the representative’s performance (e.g., as being
too sympathetic to the industry), people can decline to re-elect the
representative for a second term.
The partial funding of the hybrid agency by the search engines
might enable them to exert influence over the agency.402 What if
Google threatened not to fund the agency in protest of how the agency
was deciding appeals? One way to avoid such a problem would be to
have the agency entirely publicly funded. However, besides being
expensive, public funding minimizes the level of commitment of the
search engines in the hybrid agency in ways that may be even more
counterproductive. Without financial “buy in” from Google and the
other search engines, the search engines may be less prone to consider
the agency a joint partnership of their own. A better solution may be
to preserve the partial private funding of the agency, but have the
agency obtain commitments from the participating search engines that
subjects them to financial and other penalties if they threaten to pull
their funding for political reasons.
While industry capture is always a concern with any agency, in this
context it may be less so. The search industry is not like some other
industries that are dominated by several big players. Given Google’s
dominance in the search market in the EU, the other search engines
such as Bing and Yahoo! may not necessarily agree with Google. An
enterprising search engine could take positions that are competitive
with Google (e.g., more privacy protective) in an attempt to compete
in the search engine market in the EU.403
402 Cf. id. at 22-23 (discussing problems to independence that may arise when
agency funding comes from federal budget, creating an agency incentive to placate
Congress).
403 Google is a dominant search engine worldwide, but it is not inconceivable for
another search engine to gain market share. In Russia, the search engine Yandex has a
significant market share (38%), with Google at 53%, according to Statcounter —
although Liveinternet.ru has different figures, with Yandex having a majority of
market share in Russia. See A Closer Look at Yandex’s Market Share in Russia,
ICROSSING (April 2, 2015), http://connect.icrossing.co.uk/a-closer-look-at-yandexsmarket-share-in-russia_12575. Yandex opposes the upcoming Russian right to be
forgotten, however. See Ilya Khrennikov, Yandex Protests Russian ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
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The final thing to bear in mind is that the hybrid agency has limited
powers and limited jurisdiction in a field of regulation that has many
other players, including national courts and data protection
authorities, the Article 29 Working Party, and other government
entities. Thus, any “capture” of the hybrid agency would not be as
harmful as the capture of a government agency that has the sole
administrative power as regulator in a certain field.
So what’s in it for Google? Why would it agree to greater oversight?
It would do so because the proposal is a better alternative for Google
than the current structure. Google has no seat at the table in the
Article 29 Working Party or other EU policymaking institution. From
the EU’s perspective, Google is the regulated, not a regulator. By
contrast, the hybrid agency formally includes Google in the
institutional process of developing the right to be forgotten on the
same level as the EU officials. Moreover, by including Bing and Yahoo!
in the process, Google can deflect — or share — some of the blame
and criticism of how it has implemented the RTBF.
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the prominent role Google is playing in the
development of the right to be forgotten in the EU. Drawing on the
theories of Weber and Coase, the Article conceptualizes Google’s role
as a private administrative agency with quasi-lawmaking, quasiadjudicative, and quasi-enforcement powers. The central insight of my
theory of the private administrative agency is that corporations may
operate in a quasi-governmental, regulatory capacity in administering
public rights on a global scale. Such is the case with Google. While
Google’s role raises concerns of democratic accountability, it also
yields significant advantages in resources, efficiency, analytics, and
flexibility that a public agency would not possess. In order to preserve
these advantages, the Article proposes to keep intact much of Google’s
independent decision-making in processing RTBF claims. But the
Article calls for the creation of a hybrid agency (consisting of industry,
government, and democratically elected representatives) to provide
greater oversight to the entire process. The oversight agency will
create a standard RTBF form for people to use with all search engines
and will institute an administrative appellate body to resolve conflicts
among the search engines over the same RTBF claim in the EU. The
Internet Bill, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (June 15, 2015, 9:11 AM PDT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-15/yandex-protests-russian-rightto-be-forgotten-internet-bill.
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proposed oversight agency represents a form of public-private
partnership and global governance, designed to increase democratic
accountability and transparency in Google’s implementation of the
right to be forgotten.

